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ABSTRACT
Sultana, Salmin Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. Digital Provenance -
Models, Systems, and Applications. Major Professors: Elisa Bertino and Arif
Ghafoor.
Data provenance refers to the history of creation and manipulation of a data object
and is being widely used in various application domains including scientific experi-
ments, grid computing, file and storage system, streaming data etc. However, existing
provenance systems operate at a single layer of abstraction (workflow/process/OS) at
which they record and store provenance whereas the provenance captured from di↵er-
ent layers provide the highest benefit when integrated through a unified provenance
framework. To build such a framework, a comprehensive provenance model able to
represent the provenance of data objects with various semantics and granularity is
the first step. In this thesis, we propose a such a comprehensive provenance model
and present an abstract schema of the model.
We further explore the secure provenance solutions for distributed systems, namely
streaming data, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and virtualized environments. We
design a customizable file provenance system with an application to the provenance
infrastructure for virtualized environments. The system supports automatic collec-
tion and management of file provenance metadata, characterized by our provenance
model. Based on the proposed provenance framework, we devise a mechanism for
detecting data exfiltration attack in a file system. We then move to the direction of
secure provenance communication in streaming environment and propose two secure
provenance schemes focusing on WSNs. The basic provenance scheme is extended in
order to detect packet dropping adversaries on the data flow path over a period of
xv
time. We also consider the issue of attack recovery and present an extensive incident
response and prevention system specifically designed for WSNs.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
Data provenance refers to the genesis and evolution of a data object as it is processed
in and across systems. The most common forms of provenance describe relationships
between the input and output data in the form of why, where, and how provenance.
Where provenance identifies what pieces of input data contributed to the output data,
Why provenance tracks the processes and inputs that created or transformed the data
whereas How provenance describes in detail how the output data was produced.
The concept of provenance has been extensively studied for a long time, and
widely used in the archival community to denote the chain of ownership and the
manipulation history of a document which support document viability, authenticity,
and identity in preservation contexts [1]. In digital systems, provenance has had its
widest adoption in the scientific and grid computing applications in order to document
workflows, data generation and processing which are su cient to enable reproduction
and validation of results [2]. Recording provenance for GIS data helps the user to
decide if the data meets the requirements of their applications [18]. The database
community has recently explored how to support provenance collection in database
records and streams with a view to assuring the accuracy and currency of data. Oth-
ers have examined the usage of provenance for social networks, general information
retrieval processes, operating and storage systems. A more recent area of focus is
cloud computing systems where provenance can be used for resource usage and cost
optimization, data reliability, fault detection, etc.
In addition to facilitating data reproducibility, rights protection, regulatory com-
pliance, and authentication of information, provenance can be considered as a useful
tool in data and systems security. Recent research works manifest the key contri-
bution of provenance in evaluating the trustworthiness of data streams, for example,
sensor data [3], location data [4], and multi-hop network [5], etc. Systems security
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can be benefited by the forensics facility of provenance which helps expose the depen-
dencies between various components (e.g. processes, pipes, files etc.) in a system or
cross-correlate events on di↵erent machines and gives system administrators a more
complete picture of component interactions thus easing the troubleshooting. Under-
standing the provenance of polymorphic malware strains can lead to new techniques
for detecting and classifying unknown attacks [6]. Possibilities of other security func-
tionalities include performing intrusion detection [7], identifying data exfiltration [8],
etc.
While data provenance has been gaining interest as a desideratum in various do-
mains, supporting provenance in current information systems poses several technical
challenges. The contents of provenance verily depend on the context and the goals
of its usage, and thus has implications on the provenance collection and management
model. Existing provenance systems mostly operate at a single level of abstraction
at which they record and store provenance. Provenance techniques for experimental
systems, such as Chimera [9], ESSW [10], record provenance at the semantic level of
application. Other application level provenance systems capture provenance at the
level of business objects, lines of source code or other units with semantic meaning to
the context. Service oriented workflow systems record provenance at workflow stages
and data/message exchange points. System-call based systems such as ES3 [11],
PASS [12] operate at the level of system processes and files. While the provenance
collected at each level of abstraction is useful in its own right, the integration of
provenance captured from di↵erent layers achieves the highest benefit of the data
provenance. Moreover, most of these systems have their own proprietary protocols
for managing provenance, leading to the lack of interoperability at the syntactic level
between provenance records generated by heterogeneous systems. Without a unified
provenance infrastructure, provenance generated by individual components cannot re-
late to each other across di↵erent layers and systems. To build a unified provenance
infrastructure, an expressive provenance model able to represent the provenance of
data objects with various semantics and granularity is the first crucial step. In this
3
thesis, we propose a comprehensive provenance model that can encapsulate the data
provenance captured at di↵erent stages of a physical/computational process. The
model captures the characteristics of standard provenance models (e.g. OPM) and
ensures the inter-operability of provenance across di↵erent systems.
We then explore the secure provenance solutions for various distributed systems
and investigate the utility of a unified provenance model in addressing provenance
issues. Our focus is on secure and flexible yet scalable provenance collection, manage-
ment, communication, and usage in streaming data systems, wireless sensor networks
and virtualized environments. Provenance records can grow significantly over time,
adding data storage, transmission, and processing costs. Hence, such provenance sys-
tems must be vigilant in managing data. Security issues, such as integrity, access
control, reliable dissemination, etc. also add significant challenges to making prove-
nance service available and trustworthy. Although provenance modeling, collection,
and querying have been investigated extensively for workflows and curated databases,
provenance for the considered applications has not been properly addressed. More-
over, existing provenance collection mechanisms fail to achieve su cient breadth or
fidelity to address the challenges mentioned above. In this context, the contributions
of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1.1 Provenance Model
We propose a comprehensive provenance model that is (i) generic enough to record
the provenance of any data object, (ii) unified to capture and integrate both the
application and system level metadata, and (iii) tailored to fine grained access control
and originator preferences on provenance. The expressive nature of the model enables
a wide range of provenance queries. We also illustrate the utility of our model in real
world data processing systems.
4
1.2 Provenance Capture and Storage
With the emergence of distributed services (cloud computing, virtualization tech-
niques) and electronic exchanges, the need to identify data origin and its lifecycle
history becomes more intense with respect to ensuring full transparency and account-
ability. In this context, we pursue the design and implementation of a provenance
collection system for virtualized environments. Fig. 1.1 shows the provenance frame-
work we consider for this work. As the initial step, we focus on local file provenance
system and present the design of such a system, named as FiPS. It is a file sys-
tem that not only manages files but also transparently captures, stores and manages
file provenances. FiPS autonomically collects su cient metadata, conforming to our
provenance model discussed earlier, in order to recreate a file.
Centralized Provenance 
Store


















Fig. 1.1.: Provenance Framework for Virtualized Environment
We design FiPS as a thin layer operating between the Virtual File System (VFS)
and the underlying file system. In contrast to a system-call based provenance ap-
proach [7], we intercept file system calls passed through the VFS layer and then
generate provenance records. System call level approaches often fail to see how a
system call activity is translated into multiple actions in the lower layers of the OS.
Memory-mapped I/O can only be traced at the file system level. In addition, server-
side operations of network file system (NFS) are performed directly in the kernel, not
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through system calls. The system allows provenance output to a local or networked
storage.
1.3 Provenance Communication
Data outsourcing and sharing in distributed services introduce the problem of
provenance communication amongst disparate systems. We direct our research on
secure and e cient provenance communication to an emerging class of distributed
computing applications, namely the stream processing systems (focusing on sensor
networks). Here, important challenges arise due to the ephemeral data, and tight
storage, energy and bandwidth constraints of the sensor nodes. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to devise a light-weight provenance solution which does not introduce significant
overhead. Furthermore, sensors often operate in an untrusted environment, where
they may be subject to attacks. Hence, it is necessary to address security require-
ments such as confidentiality, integrity and freshness of provenance. Our goal is to
design a provenance encoding and decoding mechanism that satisfies such security and
performance needs.
We propose a framework that transmits provenance along with the sensor data
by hiding it over the inter-packet delays (IPD) (i.e. the delay between sensor data
packets). The provenance of a data packet includes the identities of nodes in the data
flow path. Each node in the path encodes one bit of provenance information over
each IPD. Hence, the provenance can be decoded by processing the IPDs required to
encode all the provenance bits. The embedding of provenance within a host medium
makes our technique reminiscent of watermarking [13]. However, since the IPDs are
used as watermark carrier, there is no data degradation due to watermarking. We
ensure the scalability of the scheme by adopting a spread spectrum based technique
which supports multi-user communication over the same medium [14].
An underlying assumption for this solution is the provenance remains same for at
least a flow of packets. The assumption is reasonable since a routing path does not
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change too often. Once the path is constructed, it is stable for a good amount of time
until there is any link or node failure. However, some sensor network applications need
to last a long time with more stringent energy requirements requiring the network
operate at a very low duty cycle. Such low-duty-cycle operation significantly reduces
node communication, sensing duty cycles, and hence data transmission. For such low
data rate WSNs, we propose a fine-grained per-packet provenance encoding strategy
whereby each node on the path securely embeds provenance information within a
Bloom filter(BF), that is transmitted along with the data. Upon receiving the data,
the Base Station extracts and verifies the provenance. While traditional provenance
security solutions use intensively cryptography and digital signatures [15], and employ
append-based data structures to store provenance, leading to prohibitive costs, our
solutions make e cient usage of bandwidth and yield very low error rates in practice.
1.4 Provenance Usage
We further investigate how to utilize provenance information for security enhance-
ment of various systems. For a file system, we design a provenance based mechanism
for the detection of a data exfiltration attack. The provenance graph of a file repre-
sents data flow that shows which processes wrote to the file, which files were used to
modify the file, etc. and provides us with the knowledge of legitimate access patterns
to a file. Thus, the file provenance graphs built during a training period help us later
on, during regular operation time, to detect an anomalous access pattern to a file if
the access pattern cannot be found in the stored provenance graph of the file.
In the domain of WSN, we focus on the intrusion detection capabilities of the
WSNs and propose a provenance based mechanism to address a critical security attack
named packet dropping attack. We extend the BF based provenance solution to detect
the attack and to identify the source of the attack i.e. the malicious node. A packet
loss is detected at the BS based on the provenance extracted from the BF. The
presence of the attack is determined by comparing the empirical average packet loss
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rate with the natural packet loss rate of the data ow path. To isolate the malicious
link, we check the consistency among the information encoded by the nodes in the
path.
However when dealing with attacks and failures it is not su cient to detect them,
one has to react as soon as possible. Today, the intrusion detection systems (IDSes)
are not equipped with response tool that would enable automatic responses and re-
covery actions. Hence, we move a step ahead and present a systematic design of an
incident response and prevention system (IRPS) for WSNs. The system reacts not
only after an attack has occurred but also on anomalous events so that the WSN
is still functional while the attack progresses. The system is dynamic as it selects
the actions in a response policy based on the severity of the event. It is distributed
since it does not require any central management for triggering the actions. The fine
grained analysis and response set optimization facilities help reducing the processing
overhead of the system. The simple yet flexible design of the response policies make
the system easily extensible to handle newer attacks.
The remainder of the thesis describes our work in detail. The outline can be
summarized as follows. We begin with a state-of-the-art summary of related work
in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the proposed provenance model. Chapter 4 de-
scribes the detailed architecture of the FiPS file provenance system. We elaborate
the secure provenance transmission mechanisms for WSNs in chapter 5, followed by
chapter 6 explaining the provenance based attack detection schemes. In chapter 7, we
present an extensive incident response and prevention system for WSNs which helps




In this chapter, we review the existing works in the areas related to our research.
2.1 Provenance Model
Existing provenance systems can be discussed under three categories depending on
their underlying data systems: (i) Workflow-based, (ii) Process-based, and (iii) OS-
based systems. In this section, we review a selection of these provenance systems and
their models and then discuss their lacking in providing a generic, unified framework.
Workflow based provenance systems [9] [16] [17] collect provenance for data-
centric workflows in a service oriented architecture. Chimera [9] defines a Virtual
Data Language (VDL) to explicitly represent the workflows. VDL conforms to a
logical data schema that represents data as abstract typed datasets and describes
provenance as relationships among datasets, procedures, calls to procedures, and zero
or more physical invocations of a specific call. Upon execution, workflows automat-
ically create invocation objects for each derivation and collects provenance as anno-
tations about the runtime process information. In myGrid, the information model of
the provenance logs contain the services invoked, their parameters, the start and end
times, the data products used and derived, and ontology descriptions. Karma collects
provenance at 11 activities transpired at 3 di↵erent levels, namely {Workflow, Ser-
vice, Application} ⇥ {-Started, -Finished, -Failed}, Data -Produced, and -Consumed.
However, all workflow based provenance models are tightly coupled to a specific sys-
tem and capture provenance only at a file granularity. Cohen et al. [18] provide a
generic and expressive formal model of provenance for scientific workflows.
Process based provenance systems [19] rely on individual services to record
their own provenance in the form of assertions that reflect the relationships between
9
represented services and data. In PreServ [19], a service invocation generates three
types of assertions: interaction that records the source and sink of the service; Actor
State with the list of input and output data of the interaction; and two Relationship
assertions that associate the Interaction assertion with the produced and consumed
data in the Actor State assertion.
PASS [12] and ES3 [11] are examples of the OS-based provenance approach.
PASS operates at the level of shared storage system and records information about
which programs are executed, their inputs, and any new files created as output. ES3
captures provenance metadata including data object identifier, domain name, input
and output files. However, none of these systems provides a formal structure for
provenance metadata.
From the above discussion, it is obvious that existing provenance models apply
only to a particular application/domain and do not support security. Open Prove-
nance Model (OPM), designed by a community e↵ort to address interoperability,
meets the following objectives: (i) to define provenance in a precise technology-
agnostic manner; (ii) to allow provenance exchange across systems; (iii) to allow
developers to build and share tools that operate on such provenance model; (iv) to
allow multiple levels of description to coexist. However, OPM is a high level rep-
resentation of provenance entities and does not consider security and granularity
requirements.
Perhaps the provenance model by Ni et al. [20] is the most comprehensive model.
However, this model documents provenance data at a granularity of operation which
basically indicates functions. This fact makes it di cult to fit the model in workflow
systems - composed of services with many underlying processes or in a large organiza-
tion where there are multiple computing domains. Since the model does not support
user specified granularity policies, the execution of a workflow will always generate a
large volume of provenance records. In addition, the model does not help generating
separate data dependency and process dependency graphs at a fast speed.
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2.2 File Provenance System
The Lineage File System (LinFS) [7] is a file system that automatically tracks
provenance at the file system level, focusing on the executable, command line argu-
ments and input files of a process as the source of provenance. Apparently, LinFS
cannot capture the complete system level provenance as it ignores the hardware and
software environment in which the process runs. LinFS modifies the Linux Kernel
to log all process creation and file related system calls in the printk bu↵er. A user
level daemon wakes up periodically to read the bu↵er and write provenance records
to an external database. This user level writing delays provenance collection and also
threatens the provenance security at LinFS.
The Provenance-aware Storage System (PASS) [12] is a file system oriented ap-
proach that automatically collects, stores, manages, and provides search capabilities
for provenance. The system collects provenance for every process and maintains
provenance information in both memory and disk. PASS intercepts system calls,
translating them into in-memory provenance records, which are then attached to key
kernel data structures. It also maintains the ancestry graph for in-memory objects
and finally maps the in-memory graph to the on-disk provenance that is then passed
to the storage layer. The storage layer PASTA, composed of a stackable file system,
uses in-kernel Berkeley DB (KBDB) [21] to store and index provenance. However,
the PASS architecture has a few limitations. Since PASS operates above the Vir-
tual File System (VFS) layer in Linux, it does not know what events pertain to the
PASS file systems. Hence, it ends up collecting data for all files on all volumes and
then discarding it. Besides, PASS does not provide security and access control for
provenance.
Story Book [22] is a file system that implements provenance file system in user
space and treats provenance events as a generic event log. A provenance source
intercepts user interaction events with application data and sends these events to
application specific extensions which interpret them and generate provenance inserts
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into one of storage backends. Queries are handled by Story Book API. Story Book
relies on external libraries to implement each of its modules. FUSE [23] and MySQL
intercept file system and database events. Extensions to Story Book’s FUSE file sys-
tem, such as the .txt and .docx modules, annotate events with application-specific
provenance. These provenance records are then inserted into either Stasis [24] or
Berkeley DB [25]. Although the user space design of Story Book simplifies its imple-
mentation, it incurs significant delay overhead to the file system operations. Also the
user level components can tamper with the provenance information.
2.3 Secure Provenance Communication
In this section, we review the state of the art related to our work on secure prove-
nance transmission for WSNs. The related works fall into three classes: secure prove-
nance for networking environment, time based flow watermarking, and applications
of in-packet Bloom filter (iBF).
2.3.1 Secure Network Provenance
Pedigree [26] captures provenance for network packets in the form of per packet
tags that store a history of all nodes and processes that manipulated the packet.
However, the scheme assumes a trusted environment which is not realistic in sensor
networks. ExSPAN [27] describes the history and derivations of network state that
result from the execution of a distributed protocol. This system also does not address
security concerns and is specific to some network use cases. SNP [28] extends network
provenance to adversarial environments. Since all of these systems are general purpose
network provenance systems, they are not optimized for resource constrained WSNs.
Hasan et al. [15] propose a chain model of provenance and ensure integrity and con-
fidentiality through encryption, checksum and incremental chained signature mecha-
nism. Syalim et al. [29] extend this method by applying digital signatures to a DAG
model of provenance. However, these generic solutions are not aware of the sensor net-
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work specific assumptions, constraints etc. Since provenance tends to grow very fast,
transmission of a large amount of provenance information along with data will incur
significant bandwidth overhead, hence low e ciency and scalability. Vijaykumar et
al. [30] propose an application specific system for near-real time provenance collection
in data streams. Nevertheless, this system traces the source of a stream long after
the process has completed. Close to our work, Chong et al. [31] propose a scheme for
embedding the provenance of data source within the dataset. While it reflects the
importance of issues we addressed, it is not intended as a security mechanism, hence,
does not deal with malicious attacks. Besides, practical issues like scalability, data
degradation, etc. have not been well addressed.
2.3.2 Time based Flow Watermarking
There exists a lot of work regarding active-timing based watermarking for network
flow [32–35]. Our watermarking scheme significantly di↵ers from these approaches in
various aspects. (i) All of these schemes embed a single watermark message over the
IPDs of a flow. On the contrary, we allow multiple nodes to watermark provenance
over the same set of IPDs. (ii) Our decoding process is completely di↵erent since it
does not retrieve the embedded provenance by inferring bits from each IPD. Instead,
we use a unique approach based on a cross-correlation and threshold based mechanism
(iii) Several mechanisms (e.g. [32]) watermark a bit by controlling the data throughput
for a certain amount of time whereas we prolong the IPD by a small amount of time.
Though Wang et al. [34], Kiyavash et al. [36] insert a watermark by delaying the
transmission of some packets, the first scheme is subject to detection and recovery
attack [37]. As described earlier, our scheme is resilient to this attack. While Kiyavash
et al. use spread-spectrum technique to make watermark delays much smaller, their
decoding process is non-blind and requires the unwatermarked IPDs to be stored in
a database.
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2.3.3 Applications of iBF
While BFs are commonly used in networking applications, iBF s have only re-
cently gained more attention being utilized in applications such as credential based
data path security [38], IP traceback [39], source routing and multicast [40, 41] etc.
The basic idea in these works is to encode the link identifiers constituent to the packet
routing path into an iBF. However, the encoding of the whole path is performed by
the data source, whereas the intermediate routers check their membership in the iBF
and forward the packet further based on this decision. This approach is infeasible
for sensor networks where the paths may change due to several reasons. Moreover,
an intermediate router only checks it own membership which may leave several in-
tegrity attacks such as all-one attack, random bit flips etc., undetected. Our approach
resolves these issues by encoding the provenance in a distributed fashion.
2.4 Detection of Packet Dropping Attack
The mechanisms to detect packet dropping attacks in WSNs can be classified into
following categories: multipath routing protocols, acknowledgement based mecha-
nisms, protocols using specialized hardware.
The multipath routing protocols [42,43] first discover multiple paths for data for-
warding and then uses these paths to provide redundancy in the data transmission
from a source. The data is encoded and divided into multiple shares and then sent
to the BS via di↵erent routes. However, these methods can not identify the mali-
cious node. They increase the network ow significantly, hence are not suitable for
the resource constrained sensor networks. Additionally, these mechanisms could be
vulnerable to route discovery attacks that prevent the discovery of non-adversarial
paths. Examples of protection mechanisms that require specialized hardware in-
clude [44], and [45]. The authors in [44] introduce a scheme called packet leashes that
uses either tight time synchronization or location awareness through GPS hardware.
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The work in [19] relies on hardware threshold signature implementations to prevent
one node from propagating errors or attacks in the whole network.
The acknowledgement based protocols [46, 47] expect the authenticated acknowl-
edgement from the intermediate nodes and the BS within a certain time. This method
would render malicious packet dropping detectable at the end points (data source or
the BS). However, the method incurs high communication overhead and in some cases
has to be augmented with other techniques for diagnosis and isolation of the attackers.
2.5 Incident Response and Prevention System
We discuss the work related to Kinesis in following categories: intrusion detection
and/or response system for wireless networks, policy specification, daemon selection.
Intrusion detection and response system: A number of IDSes have been pro-
posed for wireless and mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET) and WSNs. The majority
of these IDSes just raise an alarm or take simple response actions without following
any systematic approach. In a pioneering work, Zhang et al. propose a distributed
and cooperative IDS for MANET [48]. Each mobile node runs a local IDS agent that
monitors local activities, detects intrusions, and may trigger responses. Neighboring
IDS agents cooperate in global intrusion detection when there is inconclusive evidence.
The architecture is similar to Kinesis but is more focused on intrusion detection and
does not provide a well-designed response framework. Marti et al. propose a mecha-
nism to improve throughput in MANETs in the presence of compromised nodes [49].
They use a watchdog to identify misbehaving nodes and a trust based routing path
rating scheme to help routing protocols avoid these nodes. The CONFIDANT pro-
tocol aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive
to deny cooperation [50]. Trust relationships and routing decision are based on expe-
rienced, observed, or reported routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes. The
responses in these systems, however, are limited to rerouting data or isolating the
misbehaving node.
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Ma et al. [51] propose a self adaptive IDS (SAID) for WSN, where three agents,
namely monitor, decision, and defense agents, cooperate to defend from intruders in
networks. However, the response system in SAID does not follow a systematic ap-
proach and the responses are only limited to revoking or suspending a node. Also,
the agents need to update a central knowledge base continuously to update the node
reputations and to choose response agents accordingly. Hsieh et al. [52] propose an
adaptive security design to secure cluster communication via neighbor node authen-
tication, secure link establishment, and send alarms to the BS upon an intrusion.
The mechanism proposed by Younis et al. [53] adapts the security provision to the
need of the application and the trust of the nodes in the routing path. These mecha-
nisms heavily depend on cryptographic operations and the counterattack is limited to
routing path rotation or raising alarms. Taddeo et al. [54] propose a self-adaptation
method of security mechanisms. They always start with the highest security level,
which may be unnecessary and costly for sensor nodes.
Asim et al. [55] propose an architecture that organizes the WSN nodes in a virtual
grid of cells. Each cell has a manager responsible for anomaly detection and recovery.
Their approach is not fully distributed and focuses on network failures and energy
related issues, rather than on malicious behaviors or attacks. MALADY is a machine
learning-based system that enables nodes to use gathered data to make real-time de-
cisions [56]. However, MALADY aims at the detection and learning process rather
than response to attacks. Mamun et al. [57] propose a policy based intrusion detec-
tion and response system with a four level hierarchy architecture. Their intrusion
response system has a general scope based on customizable policies. However, their
only responses are suspend or revocation of the suspect node, and are only applicable
to the hierarchical architecture they consider. To the best of our knowledge, Kinesis
is the first complete system able to manage automated responses not only to attacks,
but also to anomalies with an aim to minimize disruption to WSN services while
natural error or an attack progresses.
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Policy specification: A number of policy languages have been proposed for
the specification of policies for quality-of-service management within a network [58],
privacy management for web users [59], access control in database systems [60], etc.
However, these languages serve specific purposes and do not consider the context
of WSNs or IRPSes, required to optimally express the response policies. Hence,
the resource constrained nature of sensor devices makes it challenging to utilize the
typical policy languages used in general purpose networks, database systems, and
other domains. We propose a simple and lightweight policy language considering the
IRPS specific requirements for WSNs.
Daemon selection: Leader election is a fundamental and well studied prob-
lem in fault-tolerant distributed computing. Garcia-Molina [61] first proposed leader
election protocols for distributed systems in order to elect a coordinator node which
reorganizes the active nodes after a crash failure and helps them continue the de-
sired tasks. In the context of wired and wireless networks, leader election has a
variety of applications such as key distribution, routing coordination, general control,
etc. and a considerable number of leader election protocols [62] has been proposed
over the years. In a similar context, many clustering algorithms [63] have been pro-
posed for WSNs to group sensor nodes into network clusters and to elect a leader
for each cluster for cluster management and data aggregation. However, these leader
election protocols require multiple rounds of group communication and often time
synchronization among the participants. In contrast, we propose a daemon selection
mechanism that selects a node for executing response action in a neighborhood via a
self-organized competition among the neighbors. Each node in a neighborhood com-
petes independently using a locally managed action timer. We do not need any
time synchronization or message exchanges among the neighbors.
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3. A COMPREHENSIVE PROVENANCE MODEL
In this section, we present our proposed provenance model that is well comprehensive
to represent the provenance of data objects with various semantics and granularity.
We start by discussing the goals that shaped our design and also present an abstract
schema of the model. We also compare the capabilities of our provenance model with
other major models from various aspects.
3.1 Design Goals
In order to provide a generic provenance structure for all kinds of data objects,
the provenance model must meet the following requirements:
Unified Framework: The model must be able to represent metadata provided by
the various provenance systems. Although a number of system-call based provenance
architectures [11] [12] have been proposed to capture file provenance, there is no well
defined model to represent and organize such low level metadata. One important goal
for any comprehensive provenance model is to bridge this gap and provide a unified
model able to represent provenance for any kind of data at any abstraction layer. To
this end, it is crucial to identify a comprehensive set of features that can characterize
the existing provenance systems and systemize provenance management.
Provenance Granularity: Provenance may be fine-grained, e.g. provenance of
data tuples in a database [64], or coarse-grained, such as for a file in a provenance-
aware file system [12] or for collections of files generated by an ensemble experiment
run [17]. The usefulness of provenance in a certain domain is highly related to the
granularity at which it is recorded [65]. Thus, the provenance model should be flex-
ible enough to encapsulate various subjects and details of provenance based on user
specifications.
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Security: The model must support provenance security. Access control and
privacy protection are primary issues in provenance security [66]. The problem of
access control for provenance is complicated by the fact that di↵erent access control
policies, possibly from di↵erent sources, may have to be enforced. Moreover, the data
originators may specify personal preferences on the disclosure of particular provenance
information. To meet these requirements, the provenance model must support the
specification of privacy-aware fine grained access control policies and user preferences.
Interoperability: A data object can be modified by and shared among multiple
computing systems and so is the provenance. To support provenance exchange, the
model must support interoperability among provenance models and integration of
provenance across di↵erent systems. Thus the model must conform to the Open
Provenance Model (OPM) which provides a high level representation of provenance
focusing on interoperability.
Provenance Queries and Views: The model should support various types of
provenance queries. Historical dependencies as well as subsequent usages of a data
object should be tracked easily. If a data is processed in multiple system domains, an
administrator might want to see a high level machine, system or domain view of the
provenance graph. In addition, to find relevant information from large provenance
graphs, one should be able to filter, group or summarize all/portions of provenance
graphs and to generate tailored provenance views. Thus, the model should be able
to distinguish the provenance generated from di↵erent systems and facilitate queries
for constructing specialized views of provenance graphs.
3.2 The Model
Fig. 4.1(a) shows the proposed provenance model consisting of entities and the
interactions among them. To characterize our model, we define the provenance as:
Definition (Provenance). The provenance of a data object is the documented his-
tory of the actors, process, operations, inter-process/operation communications, envi-
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ronment, access control and other user preferences related to the creation and modifi-
cation of the object. The relationships between provenance entities form a provenance
graph (DAG) for the data object.
Fig. 3.1.: Proposed Provenance Model
Data creation or manipulation is performed by a sequence of operations initi-
ated by a process. A process, consisting of a sequence of operations, may be a ser-
vice/activity in a workflow, a user application, or an OS-level (e.g. UNIX) process.
An operation executes specific task(s) and causes manipulation to some system or
user data. Thus, the operations do not only generate/modify persistent data but also
generate intermediate results or modify system configurations. Communication rep-
resents the interaction (e.g. data flow) between two processes or two operations in a
process. Communication between two operations in a process means the completion of
an operation following the start of another operation. When the preceding operation
results in data, the communication may involve data passing between the operations.
The communication may also contain triggers, specific messages, etc. However, in
most of the cases there might be no explicit message (i.e. communication record) ex-
change between two operations. Web service, user application, and UNIX process are
examples of processes; statements within an executable, function, command line, etc.
exemplify the operations; while data flow, copy-paste, inter-process communication
in UNIX, etc. represent the communication between operations or processes.
An operation may take data as input and output some data. Each data object
is associated with a lineage record which specifies the immediate data objects that
20
have been used to generate this data. Lineage is particularly helpful for producing
the data dependency graph of a data object.
Processes, operations, and communications are operated by actors that can be
human users, workflow templates, etc. Where data provenance is used to detect
intrusion or system changes, the knowledge of a user role or the workflow template
may be helpful. Environment refers to the operational state, parameters, system
configurations that also a↵ect the execution of an operation and thus output data.
This additional provenance information is crucial for understanding the performance
of the operation and the nature of the output [66].
Security and privacy of provenance are crucial since data or provenance may con-
tain sensitive or commercially valuable information. The nature of this confidential
information is specific to the applications and hence the protection policies and the
access control can be handled by the involved actors. To address these requirements,
access control policies by actors are included in the provenance model. These access
control policies specify whether and how other actors may utilize process, operation,
communication and lineage records.
Since our provenance model can capture the very details of an operation, it might
by preferable to allow users to specify the desired level of provenance details. For
example, in a scientific workflow, it may su ce to capture the provenance information
in a service/activity whereas in a command line (e.g. sort), it may be required to
record the OS level operations, system configuration etc. The granularity policies
allow the users to specify how detailed provenance data they want to be captured
and stored.
Table 3.1: Mapping between the entities in OPM and our model
Property OPM Entity Entity in our Model
Physical or digital data object Artifact Data Object
Action(s) performed on or by ar-
tifacts






Our model conforms to the OPM representation. Provenance in OPM is described
using a directed graph consisting of entities with connecting edges [67]. OPM entities
are of three types, namely artifact, process, agent. There are five types of edges
which represent the causal dependencies amongst entities. Table 3.1 shows how our
provenance model complies with the OPM by listing the OPM entities and their
counterparts in our model. Table 3.2 shows a comparison of our provenance model
with other major models from various design aspects.
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To illustrate the utility of our provenance model, we consider some use cases and
identify the provenance entities in these contexts. Figure 3.2(a) shows a workflow
example from the field of functional MRI research [68], where brain images of some
subjects are spatially aligned and then averaged to produce a single image. The
workflow contains the automated image registration (AIR) process that operates on
a collection of anatomy images and produces an averaged brain image. An actor
(e.g. an administrator of the experiment system) specifies a granularity policy for
automated provenance collection to capture provenance at the process granularity.
In this context, the provenance for ‘Atlas image’ and ‘Atlas header’ contains the
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(a) Workflow for ‘Automated Image
Registration’ (AIR) process
(b) Break down of AIR process into
operations and data flows between
them





Fig. 3.2.: Usecases for Provenance Modeling
AIR process with anatomy and references images & headers as the input lineage
data. Since no details about the AIR process are captured, we assume the process
consists of a single operation named as AIR. Figure 3.2(b) presents the breakdown
of the AIR process into operations and interactions between them. If a user defined
policy requires to capture operation level provenance, the provenance graph for ‘Atlas
image’ will contain the AIR process with operation hierarchy align warp -> reslice
-> softmean. The data flow between operations represents their communication;
for example the transfer of Warp param 1 indicates the communication between
align warp and reslice operations. However, the data dependency graph of ‘Atlas
image’ contains the input images as well as all the intermediate results.
Finally, we consider a UNIX shell script - ‘pattern.sh’, shown in Figure 3.2(c) to
show the applicability of our model to provenance aware file/storage systems, oper-
ating systems, etc. The script uses the ‘grep’ command to extract all the patterns
starting with ‘Alam’ from the ‘data.txt’ file and sends the output to the ‘awk’ com-
mand through a pipe. The ‘awk’ command then extracts particular information from
the input data and writes the information in the output file ‘Alam.txt’. The exe-
cution of the script (namely ‘pattern’ process) may be assigned a unique process ID
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by the system. The process consists of two operations, ‘grep’ and ‘awk’. Thus, the
provenance of ‘Alam.txt’ contains the operation dependency grep -> awk and the
data dependency on ’data.txt’ and the intermediate pipe (identified by an ID).
3.4 Provenance Records
Data provenance is stored as a set of provenance records in a provenance repos-
itory [20]. Provenance storage, manipulation and query can be implemented using
data management systems characterized by di↵erent data models such as the relation
model, XML, and RDF. Since our provenance model is generic, we do not specify
implementation details here. We represent our model as the relationships among the
following provenance records (see Fig 3.3): (i) Process (ii) Operation (iii) Commu-
nication (iv) Actor (v) Environment (vi) Lineage (vii) Access Control Policy (viii)
Granularity Policy.
Each record consists of several attributes some of which are optional based on the
provenance capturing granularity. Each data object and provenance record is uniquely
identified by an ID attribute. Since provenance information may be exchanged across
di↵erent systems, we use domain to specify the scope of the provenance records i.e.
the system where the executions and data manipulations occur. The domain value
may include a particular application, a workflow, a machine, a system domain, or
any combination of these. This attribute is extremely useful when customizing the
provenance graph to e ciently generate an abstract domain view. Some records
contain a timestamp attribute for supporting time-sensitive provenance queries and
access control policies.
We describe a process with the base class process and di↵erentiate between the
high level and the system process by creating two inherited classes of process. Each
process is executed by an actor in a certain computational environment and may
generate output data. If the process is part of a scientific workflow, web service,
etc., it is distinguished by the subclass Application Process which also contains the
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Fig. 3.3.: Class Diagram of the Provenance Model
workflow ID. The System Process class describes the OS level processes and possesses
workflow ID as well as the host application process ID.
Operation record attributes include ID, process ID, actor ID, environment ID,
description, input and output ID. Depending on the applications, the description
attribute may contain a statement or a block of statements, a function defined by
pseudo-code or source code, but it can also be only a function name. The output of
an operation may be not only the persistent data but also intermediate results for
which the user might not be interested to store the provenance.
A communication record is the provenance of a real or virtual message implement-
ing the interaction between two operations in a process or two di↵erent processes.
Specific details of its description attribute depend on applications. The carrier at-
tribute includes the message transferring channel, e.g. email, which may be sensitive
and useful in some cases, e.g. digital forensics.
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Lineage record attributes include lineage ID, corresponding data ID, the process
& operation ID that produced this data operating on a list of data objects (described
by List <Lineage ID>). The attributes of Actor record include actor ID, name,
and role. Actors usually have names and roles. A role is a job function of the
actor. Someone may argue why not use the actor information from human resource
databases. A human being may have di↵erent roles during the career time. Thus
he/she may have di↵erent versions of actor records with di↵erent roles for di↵erent
process/operation/preference records. This is the reason why we cannot rely only on
the information from the actor records stored in human resource databases. Such
a record usually only stores the latest actor information, but an actor record in a
provenance store needs to record complete historical actor information.
The content of the Environment record heavily depends on the application do-
main. Usually each operation, sometimes a process, has at most one environment
record. We choose to separate this record from the process/operation record because
of two reasons. First, the schema and size of environment records vary with respect
to di↵erent process/operation records. Some process records do not have an environ-
ment record; however others may have a complex environment. Second, it is possible
that two di↵erent process records may share the same environment record. Environ-
ment records do not need timestamps because their timestamps are determined from
the parent process/operation records.
Access Control Policy record attributes include policy ID, actor ID, subject, con-
dition, e↵ect, obligations. This record is used to specify the access preferences of the
actor. Sometimes it is also useful to record the preferences expressed by the subject
of the operation/communication, for example a patient in the case of health care ap-
plications. The actor ID logs the author of the record. The subject attribute is used
to specify the record(s) at which the access control aims. The subject of an access
control policy record only refers to a process, operation or a communication record.
Granularity Policy record comprises of policy ID, actor ID, subject, condition and
policy attributes. This record allows the users to specify the level of details desired for
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provenance metadata and is applicable when capturing provenance. For example, an
actor may define policies to capture provenance only at the process level or to exclude
the lineage information for a particular application. The subject attribute states the
targeted record at which the granularity policy applies based on the condition value.
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 header 1 1 victor 1 3 null align warp 1,2 7
6
Reference 
image 1 2 victor 1 3 null align warp 3,4 8
7 Warp param 1 3 victor 2 3 null reslice 7 9,10
8 Warp param 2 4 victor 2 3 null reslice 8 11,12





10 Reslice image 1 Lineage
11 Reslice headr 2 ID Data ID Domain Operation ID Lineage IDs
12 Reslice image 2 1 1 victor 1 null
13 Atlas header … … … … …
14 Atlas image 7 7 victor 1 1,2
Actor 8 8 victor 2 3,4
ID Name Role 9 9 victor 3 7
1 Jame user 10 10 victor 3 7
2 Katty admin 11 11 victor 4 8
12 12 victor 4 8
13 13 victor 5 9,10,11,12
14 14 victor 5 9,10,11,12
Granularity Policy
ID Domain Actor ID Subject Condition Policy
1 victor 2 process
process.
executabl ID = 
AIR Collect  ALL
Fig. 3.4.: Provenance Records for workflow in Fig 3.2(b).
It is important to mention that a provenance graph is maintained as a DAG. In
case of write operation to an existing file, a cycle may be introduced. To preserve
the DAG property, we allow the versioning of data objects where manipulating an
existing data object takes the existing object as an input and outputs a latest version
of the data object. Another relevant issue is to allow actors to rationally change their
access control/granularity policies on their own records. Since a provenance store
is immutable, in order to support such selective updates, we use policy versioning
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and time stamping. Given a query, if multiple access control policies from the same
actor apply, the most recent one will take precedence. Such an approach preserves
the previous policies and the associated data provenance records. To illustrate the
application of provenance records to the use cases from section 3.3, we consider a
RDBMS implementation of the provenance storage. Figure 3.4 shows the data objects
and related provenance records generated from the workflows in 3.2(b). For simplicity,
we do not show some attributes e.g. timestamp.
3.5 Supported Queries
Having defined a comprehensive provenance model, we can use any standard query
language to query the entities in the model. The wide range of queries supported by
our model can facilitate the users in many di↵erent respects, such as scientific repro-
ducibility, script generation, anomaly detection, etc. We discuss below the various
queries supported by our provenance model:
Fundamental Queries on Entity Attributes: These queries retrieve infor-
mation about the fundamental entities of the provenance model. Examples of such
queries are: find processes by namespace, find all the operations belonging to a pro-
cess, generate the sequence of processes/operations in a workflow. These queries can
help in detecting anomalies by comparing the expected output of an operation in the
recorded environment with the actual result. Users that have executed anomalous
operations can also be identified by finding out the actors that invoked the operations.
Queries on Invocations: These queries retrieve the set of commands involved
in the manipulation of a selected data object. Users can set various filters while
retrieving the provenance, such as remove commands that occurred before or after a
given point of time. We also support lookup queries that allow users to search for
data objects based on arguments to the processes that modified them. These queries
facilitate users in using provenance for reproducing a data object, detecting system
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changes or intrusions, finding out the system configuration during process invocation,
understanding system dependencies, etc.
Queries on Lineage: The historical dependencies of a data object can be de-
termined by traversing the provenance graph backward whereas data usage can be
traced by forward traversal of the graph. A simple query is of the form: find the
ancestor data objects to data d. More complex queries may refer to patterns within
the derivation graph. The basic approach is to match specific patterns of processes
consisting of operations and communications and enabling the composition of flow-
pattern objects. The flowpattern graphs can match either a fixed or varying number
of nodes of their corresponding types in any workflow defined in the database. Pos-
sible queries include:find the data objects that are result of a specific flowpattern, and
find all operations in a workflow whose inputs have been processed by a specific flow
pattern.
Provenance View: Since provenance grows fast, it might be convenient (often
required) to compress or summarize the provenance graph for e cient querying and
navigation. For example, instead of keeping track of how di↵erent processes and
people modified a document five years ago, we can replace the part of the provenance
with the end result of the modification. Since our provenance model has a modularized
structure, we support queries to generate any abstraction of a provenance graph.
The domain attribute in the provenance records greatly helps in writing a quick and
e↵ective abstraction function for an intended purpose.
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4. A FILE PROVENANCE SYSTEM
In this chapter, we discuss the design objectives for an e cient file provenance sys-
tem and then present the modular design of a low-overhead file provenance system,
called FiPS. The system supports the automatic collection and management of file
provenance metadata, characterized by our provenance model proposed in chapter 3.
4.1 Design Goals
Based on the features of the existing file system provenance solutions and their
limitations, we outline the following design goals required to build a robust file prove-
nance system:
Portability: The file provenance system should capture provenance for any file
system, without modifying the OS or the provenanced file system. FiPS is designed as
a stackable filesystem and thus can be layered on top of any conventional file system.
In addition, FiPS is to be implemented as a kernel module which requires no kernel
modification in order to collect provenance.
E ciency: It is essential that provenance capture and management do not add
too much overhead to the file system operations with respect to space and time.
The provenance system should provide fast, high-throughput provenance operations
in order to avoid impacting operating system and application performance. The
system must record enough provenance metadata to serve the desired purpose but
not any unintended information. Hence, it should distinguish between data objects
that are required to be provenanced and data objects that are not. On the other
hand, capturing provenance information by intercepting system calls often misses
information about how a system call activity is translated into multiple actions in the
lower layers of the OS. Also NFS servers cannot work with system call level logging
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since they operate directly in kernel, not through system calls. Finally, it is more
natural to manage file system provenance in terms of file system instead of system
calls. We design FiPS as a thin layer between the Virtual File System (VFS) and any
other file system which results in space and time e ciency.
Security: The system must capture and store provenance in a way so that the
information is kept secure against attacks and subversion. Besides, the provenance
information may require access control to be protected from unauthorized user access.
Our in-kernel system design provides stronger security. Moreover, the provenance
processor can be implemented in a way to apply appropriate security mechanisms
(e.g. encryption, signature) while sending provenance to persistent storage.
Queries on Provenance: Collecting data provenance is not useful unless the
provenance can be accessed and utilized easily. Hence, the file provenance system
must provide support for a structured storage of provenance which in turn will facili-
tate provenance queries. The management system should also respond quickly to the
relationship queries leading to the generation of ancestry or descendancy graphs.
4.2 FiPS - The Proposed Provenance Framework
In this section, we present the provenance framework we propose. Our prove-
nance framework consists of the following components: (i) Provenance Collector, (ii)
Provenance Log, (iii) Provenance Processor, and (iv) Provenance Storage. Below, we
provide more details on the various provenance components.
4.2.1 Provenance Model
FiPS is designed to collect and store provenance for the data objects at a file gran-
ularity. We define the provenance of a data object (file) as the documented history of
the actors, process, operations, inter-process/operation communications, input/output
data, and OS environment related to the creation and modification of the object. The
input data may contain references to data objects which are also provenanced. Thus,
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the complete provenance of a data object is the transitive closure over all such ref-
erences which form a directed acyclic graph (DAG), referred to as the provenance
graph.
To represent provenance graph, we use a subset of entities from our provenance
model, which includes controlling Actor, executing Process, and data File as node
types. The edges between nodes are characterized by the relationships that relate
which process wasControlledBy which actor, which file wasGeneratedBy which pro-
cess, which process used which file, which process wasTriggeredBy which other pro-
cess, and which file wasDerivedFrom which other file. Figure 4.1(a) illustrates the
graph representation of various types of nodes, whereas the edges are annotated with
the relationship type. Figure 5.1 shows an example provenance graph where process
P writes to a file F .
Agent Process File 
(a) Graph representation




(b) Example of a prove-
nance graph
Fig. 4.1.: Provenance graph representation and example
More formally, a provenance graph for a file can be represented as g = (V,E),
where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of directed edges connecting the vertices,
and we use g.root to represent the root node of graph g (i.e., the file). A vertex can
either represent a process, user agent or file object. An edge between two vertices
v1 and v2 is introduced when a dependency (of any of the above mentioned types) is
created from the entity that corresponds to v1 to the entity that corresponds to v2.
4.2.2 Provenance Collector
We design the provenance collector as a stackable file system [69] that can work
on top of any underlying file system. Figure 4.2(b) shows how the collector is placed
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between the Virtual File System (VFS) and any other file system. In a traditional
file system, the system calls related to file operations invoke VFS calls which in turn
invoke underlying file system procedures. When integrated, the provenance collector
intercepts the VFS calls, extract arguments and other necessary information from
kernel data structures, constructs a log entry and writes it to an in-memory bu↵er.



















(a) Architecture of the provenance management sys-
tem
User Application 
GNU C Library 
System Call Interface 
Individual File System (Ext3, NFS) 
Provenance Collector 
Virtual File System 




(b) Provenance Collector as a stackable
file system
Fig. 4.2.: Proposed Provenance Framework
Figure 4.2(a) shows the detailed architecture of the provenance collector. The key
components are: the provenance logger which captures the provenance metadata and
translates them into in-memory log entries, and the provenance writer that stores in-
memory entries into an userspace log file. Below, we briefly discuss the components
of the provenance collection infrastructure:
Logger: The role of a logger is to observe provenance generating events, to capture
relevant metadata from kernel for each event, and then to write one or more entries
to an intermediate storage. Our design supports multiple logger threads where the
intercepted VFS calls pertaining to an application or process will be handled by
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one logger. Such a design will increase the speed of the provenance tracking for
simultaneous processes and make it easier to deal with the granularity policies.
All files and processes in our system are considered provenanced kernel objects.
To generate provenance records, the logger intercepts the following process and file
related system calls: fork(), clone(), exit(), read(), write(), rename(), truncate, sym-
link(), readlink(), unlink(). By intercepting the system calls, the logger can capture
a wide variety of events:
• Reads and writes to file descriptors, including regular files, device files, and
pipes.
• File operations: renaming, changing permissions, etc.
• Inter-process communication, such as shared memory, message queues, and
UNIX domain sockets.
• Network communication between provenanced hosts.
• Program execution with full arguments and environment.
On each event, a logger thread collects provenance metadata, creates a log entry
and stores the entry in an in-memory First In, First Out (FIFO) bu↵er. The typical
information included in a log entry is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Typical Provenance Metadata
Field Explanation
provid Provenance identifier
name Name of the file/process executable
pid OS assigned process identifier
ppid Parent process identifier
uid OS assigned user id
argv The command line
env The process environment, i.e., OS version, etc.
input Name or inode number of the input files
For the purposes of recording provenance, each log entry is assigned an identifier,
referred to as provid. All the log entries related to the activity of a process in a single
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session are assigned the same and an unique provid. The provid is generated as a
small unique integer.
Writer: A writer dequeues a log record from the in-memory FIFO and writes
out the record in a userspace log file, referred to as Provenance Log. The system also
activates multiple writers, like loggers, in order to fasten the performance.
4.2.3 Provenance Log
The provenance log is a medium of communicating provenance from kernel to user
space. Since provenance collection generates a large volume of data [70], we need an
e cient and reliable mechanism for making large quantities of kernel data available
to userspace. Existing systems have accomplished this by using an expanded printk
bu↵er [7], writing directly to on-disk log files [71], using FUSE [23] or relayfs [72], a
specially designed mechanism to e ciently transfer data from kernel to user space.
None of these methods but relayfs is appropriate for our system design. Hence, we
follow [72] to use relayfs for our purpose.
A relay [73] is a kernel ring bu↵er made up of a set of preallocated sub-bu↵ers.
Once the relay has been initialized, the collector writes provenance data to it using
the relay write function. This data then appears in userspace as a regular file, which
can be read by the provenance processor. Since the relay is backed by a bu↵er, it
retains provenance data even when the processor is not running, as is the case when
the processor crashes and must be restarted. Since the number and size of the sub-
bu↵ers in the relay are specified when it is created, the relay has a fixed size. Although
the collector can act accordingly if it is about to overwrite provenance which has not
yet been processed by the processor, it is better to avoid this situation altogether.




The responsibility of the provenance processor is to interpret, process, and store
the provenance data after it is collected. In our design, we decouple the provenance
processor from the collection process in order to allow the system administrator to
implement the processor to support the need of the system. For example, a system
may want to process the provenance information in a specific way, aggregate/truncate
provenance information before sending to persistent storage or even may use di↵erent
storage mechanism.
Such a modular design also keeps complex algorithms out of the collector. Existing
systems have devoted considerable e↵ort to dealing with problems in provenance
representation, such as compact storage or graph cycles [74]. Our design simply
allows the processor to address these problems in whatever way is most appropriate.
4.2.5 Provenance Storage
To facilitate collecting large volumes of provenance metadata and primarily ini-
tiating graph queries, we use graph database as the provenance storage. A graph
database stores data in a graph, the most generic of data structures, capable of el-
egantly representing any kind of data in a highly accessible way. The fundamental
units that form a graph are nodes and relationships. Both nodes and relationships
can contain properties, a record that has named values. Relationships organize Nodes
into arbitrary structures, allowing a Graph to resemble a List, a Tree, a Map, or
a compound Entity any of which can be combined into yet more complex, richly
inter-connected structures. Apart from properties and relationships, nodes can also
be labeled with zero or more labels. Labels are a means of grouping the nodes in
the graph. They can be used to restrict queries to subsets of the graph, as well as
enabling optional model constraints and indexing rules.
After reading and processing a log entry from the provenance log, the provenance
processor creates appropriate provenance entities and relationships. The module then
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File  
•  name = F  
•  inode no = 160 
Process  
•  name = P  
•  argv = … 
wasGeneratedBy 
Agent  
•  uid = 1 
wasControlledBy  
Fig. 4.3.: An example provenance graph stored in provenance database
stores these entities and relationships in a graph database, referred to as provenance
database. An example provenance graph, for the event when process P writes to a
file F , stored in the provenance database is shown in Fig. 4.3.
4.3 Prototype Implementation
We implement our system in Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. To layer our provenance collec-
tor on top of any conventional file system, we implement our functionalities on the
stackable wrapper file system Wrapfs [69]. As we discussed in Sec., we use kernel ring
bu↵er, relay, to present provenance records as userspace Provenance Log file. We im-
plement provenance processor as a Java application which processes Provenance Log
file and also interacts with Provenance Database. The graph database Neo4j provides
us with the facility to store provenance information as a graph and to perform graph
queries. It guarantees us e ciency while searching for a given access graph in the
provenance database, and thus ensures the scalability of the system.
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5. LIGHTWEIGHT SECURE PROVENANCE SCHEMES
FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
In this chapter, we embark on an exploration into provenance management for stream-
ing data focusing on WSNs. Specifically, we examine a secure mechanism to form and
transmit the provenance graph of a data packet in a distributed setting where a source
node generates the data and the intermediate node(s) towards the BS may process
the in-transit data. A possible approach to the problem could be based on traditional
security solutions like encryption, digital signature, and message authentication code
(MAC). In a digital signature (or MAC) based mechanism, each party involved in the
data processing would append its information to data and sign it (or compute and
attach the MAC) to ensure authenticity. In addition, encryption and an incremen-
tal chained signature based approach for secure document provenance [75] could be
adapted for use in sensor networks. However, such approaches are not applicable in
resource constrained WSNs, because provenance information tends to grow very fast,
often becoming several magnitudes in size larger than the original data [75]. Such
a characteristic thus would force the transmission of a vast amount of provenance
information along with data. Encryption/signature/MAC based mechanisms cannot
help in reducing such size even after compaction. Hence, traditional security means
incur significant bandwidth overhead and impact e ciency and scalability. Address-
ing the above challenges, we propose two techniques - (i) a watermarking scheme for
per-flow provenance encoding and decoding over the inter-packet delays (IPD), (ii) a
per-packet provenance scheme using iBF. Di↵erent WSN applications may prefer one
solution over the other depending on the network data rates.
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5.1 Background and System Model
In this section, we introduce the network, data and provenance models used. We
also present the threat model and security requirements. Finally, we provide brief
primers on digital watermarking, spread-spectrum watermarking and fundamental
fundamental properties and operations of Bloom filters.
Network Model. We consider a multihop wireless sensor network, consisting of
a number of sensor nodes and a base station (BS) that collects data from the network.
The network is modeled as a graph G(N,L), where N = {n
i
|, 1  i  |N |} is the
set of nodes, and L is the set of links, containing an element l
i,j





that are communicating directly with each other. Sensor nodes are
stationary after deployment, but routing paths may change over time, e.g., due to
node failure. Each node reports its neighboring (i.e. one hop) node information to
the BS after deployment. The BS assigns each node a unique identifier nodeID, a
symmetric cryptographic key K
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, an integer greater than 0, is the length
of the PN sequence. In addition, a set of hash functions H = {h1, h2, ..., hk} are
broadcast to the nodes.
Data Model. We assume a multiple-round process of data collection. Each sensor
node generates data periodically, and individual values are routed and aggregated
towards the BS using any existing hierarchical (i.e., tree-based) dissemination scheme,
e.g., [76]. A data path of p hops is represented as < n
l
, n1, n2, ..., np >, where nl is
a leaf node representing the data source, and node n
i
is i hops away from n
l
. Each
non-leaf node in the path aggregates the received data and provenance with its own
locally-generated data and provenance.
Each data packet contains (i) a unique packet sequence number (ii) a data value,
(iii) timestamp, and (iv) provenance. The sequence number is attached to the packet




















Fig. 5.1.: Provenance graph for a sensor network.
Depending on the solution approach considered, the timestamp/sequence number
integrity is ensured through message authentication codes (MAC).
Provenance Model. We consider node-level provenance, which encodes the
nodes that are involved at each step of data processing. This representation has
been used in previous research for trust management [78] and for detecting selective
forwarding attacks [79].
Given a data packet d, its provenance is modeled as a directed acyclic graph
G(V,E) where each vertex v 2 V is attributed to a specific node HOST (v) = n
and represents the provenance record (i.e. nodeID) for that node. Each vertex in the
provenance graph is uniquely identified by a vertex ID (VID) which is generated by
the host node using cryptographic hash functions. The edge set E consists of directed
edges that connect sensor nodes.
Definition 5.1.1 (Provenance) Given a data packet d, the provenance p
d
is a di-
rected acyclic graph G(V,E) satisfying the following properties: (1) p
d
is a subgraph of






is a child of v
j










; (3) for a set U = {v
i
} ⇢ V and v
j
2 V, U is a set of children of v
j
if and only if HOST (v
j
) collects processed/forwarded data from each HOST(v
i
2 U)
to generate the aggregated result.
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Figure 5.1 shows two provenance examples in sensor networks. In Figure 5.1(a),
the leaf node n
l
generates a data packet d and each intermediate node aggregates
its own sensory data with d then forwards it towards the BS. Hence, the provenance
corresponding to d is < v
l
, v1, v2, v3 >, which can be represented as a simple path. In
Figure 5.1(b), the internal node n1 generates the data d by aggregating data d1 , ...,
d4 from nl1 , ..., nl4 and then passes d towards the BS. Here, n1 is an aggregator and
the aggregated provenance < {v
l1 , vl2 , vl3 , vl4}, v1, v2, v3 > is represented as a tree.
Threat Model and Security Objectives. We assume that the BS is trusted,
but any other arbitrary node may be malicious. An adversary can eavesdrop and
perform tra c analysis anywhere on the path. In addition, the adversary is able
to deploy a few malicious nodes, as well as compromise a few legitimate nodes by
capturing them and physically overwriting their memory. These malicious nodes
might collude to attack the system. If an adversary compromises a node, it can
extract all key materials, data, and codes stored on that node. The adversary may
drop, inject or alter packets on the links that are under its control. We do not
consider denial of service attacks such as the complete removal of provenance, since
a data packet with no provenance records will make the data highly suspicious [15]
and hence generate an alarm at the BS. Instead, the primary concern is that an
attacker attempts to misrepresent the data provenance. Our objective is to achieve
the following security properties:
• Confidentiality: An adversary cannot gain any knowledge about data prove-
nance by analyzing the IPDs or the contents of a packet. Only authorized
parties (e.g., the BS) can process and check the integrity of provenance.
• Integrity: An adversary, acting alone or colluding with others, cannot add or
remove non-colluding nodes from the provenance of benign data (i.e. data
generated by benign nodes) without being detected.
• Freshness: An adversary cannot replay captured data and provenance without
being detected by the BS.
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However, an adversary may increase network jitter in a way that the recorded IPD
at the BS is much larger than the desired value. Such an attack is intended to destroy
the embedded provenance. As we discuss later, our scheme can recover provenance if
the IPD is altered within a certain limit. In any case, the BS can detect such malicious
activity and may utilize some auxiliary mechanism to identify the attacker and take
necessary actions. Moreover, the attacker can inject or drop data packets which also
alters the IPDs and interfere with the embedded provenance. We successfully recover
provenance against the insertion attack but survive the deletion attack to a certain
extent.
Digital Watermarking. The key idea of digital watermarking is to hide a
secret information (watermark) related to a digital content within the content itself
thereby ensuring the movement of the watermark along with the content. Thus,
digital watermarking involves the selection of a watermark carrier domain and the
design of two complementary processes:
(1) An embedding process E that utilizes the watermark carrier A, the water-
mark message w, and, possibly, a key K to generate the watermarked data AW as
E(A,w,K) = AW
(2) A detector process that determines the existence of a watermark within the
received signal (with the key, if applicable) and extracts it.
Spread Spectrum Watermarking. Spread spectrum is a transmission tech-
nique by which a narrowband data signal is spread over a much larger bandwidth
so that the signal energy present in any single frequency is undetectable [14]. In
our context, the IPD is the communication channel and the provenance is the signal
transmitted through it. Provenance is spread over many IPDs such that the infor-
mation present in one IPD (i.e. container of information) is small. Consequently, an
attacker needs to add high amplitude noise to all of the containers in order to destroy
the provenance. Thus, the use of the spread spectrum technique for watermarking
provides strong security against di↵erent attacks. We have adopted the direct se-
quence spread spectrum (DSSS) technique which is widely used for enabling multiple
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users to transmit simultaneously on the same frequency range by utilizing distinct
pseudo-noise (PN) sequences [14]. The intended receiver can extract the desired user’s
signal by regarding the other signals as noise-like interferences. The components of a
DSSS system are:
Input:
• The original data signal d(t), as a series of +1, -1.
• A PN sequence px(t), encoded like the data signal. N
c
is the number of bits per
symbol and is called PN length.
Spreading : The transmitter multiplies the data with the PN code to produce spreaded
signal as s(t) = d(t) px(t)
Despreading : The received signal r(t) is a combination of the transmitted signal and
noise in the communication channel. Thus r(t) = s(t) + n(t), where n(t) is a white
Gaussian noise. To retrieve the original signal, the correlation between r(t) and the







t=T r(t) pr(t + ⌧).
If px(t) = pr(t) and ⌧ = 0 i.e. px(t) is synchronized with pr(t), then the original
signal can be retrieved. Otherwise, the data signal cannot be recovered. So, a receiver
without having the PN sequence of the transmitter cannot reproduce the originally
transmitted data. This fact is the basis for allowing multiple transmitters to share a
channel. In this paper, we refer to R(0) as cross-correlation.
In case of multiuser communication in DSSS, spreaded signals produced by multi-
ple users are added and transmitted over the channel. To retrieve the signal for j-th
user, the cross-correlation between r(t) and px
j
(t) is computed. Multi-user commu-
nication introduces noise to the signal of interest and interfere with the desired signal
in proportion to the number of users. The condition for error free communication in
DSSS can be derived from Shannon’s channel-capacity theorem





s1 s2 s3 s4
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 10 0 0 0





h2 (s1) h2 (s2) h3 (s2)
Fig. 5.2.: A Bloom filter with n = 4, m = 16 and k = 3.
where C is the amount of information allowed by the communication channel, B is the
channel bandwidth, and S/N is the signal-to-noise ratio. As S/N is usually ⌧1 for





. Thus to propagate
error-free information for a given noise-to-signal ratio in the channel, the bandwidth
should be increased to an appropriate level.
Bloom Filters (BF). A Bloom filter is a space-e cient data structure for prob-
abilistic representation of a set of items S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} using an array of m bits
with k independent hash functions h1, h2, ..., hk. The output of each hash function hi
maps an item s uniformly to the range [0, m-1] and is interpreted as an index point-
ing to a bit in a m-bit array. Hence, the BF can be represented as {b0, . . . , bm 1}.
Initially each of the m bits is set to 0.
To insert an element s 2 S into a BF, s is hashed with all the k hash functions
producing the values h
i
(s)(1  i  k). The bits corresponding to these values are
then set to 1 in the bit array. Figure 5.2 illustrates an example of BF insertion. To
query the membership of an item s0 within S, the bits at indices h
i
(s0)(1  i  k) are
checked. If any of them is 0, then certainly s0 62 S. Otherwise, if all of the bits are set
to 1, s0 2 S with high probability. There exists a possibility of error which arises due
to hashing collision that makes the elements in S collectively causing indices h
i
(s0)
being set to 1 even if s0 62 S. This is called a false positive. Note that, there is no
false negative in the BF membership verification.
The cumulative nature of BF construction inherently supports the aggregation of
BFs of a same kind, by performing bitwise-OR between the bitmaps.
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5.2 Watermarking based Provenance Scheme
Fig. 5.3 shows an overview of the distributed approach we propose to watermark
provenance over the delay between consecutive data packets. For a data packet,
provenance encoding refers to generating the vertices in the provenance graph and
watermarking them over IPDs. Each vertex originates at a node in the data path and
represents the provenance record of the host node. A vertex is uniquely identified by
the vertex ID (VID). The VID is represented by the PN sequence (of L
p
bits) of a
node and requires a number of (L
p
+ 1) packets for encoding. Due to the adoption
of DSSS based watermarking, all nodes in the provenance use the same medium
for transmitting their PN sequences. Hence, only L
p
bits of digital information are
required for watermarking the provenance. Since we utilize the IPDs, L
p
IPDs (in
other words, a sequence of L
p
+1 packets) are required for embedding and transmitting
the provenance of a data packet. We assume that, at least for such number of packets,
the provenance (i.e. data flow path) of the packets generated by a source node would
be the same. Below we discuss the provenance encoding mechanism by the sensor
nodes and decoding at the BS:
Generation of
delay perturbations
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{S1 n, S 2 , S. . . }
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After generating a data packet, the source node marks it with the generation time
and ensures the integrity of the timestamp with a MAC. The MAC is computed using
the node specific secret keyK
i
. The next L
p
data packets generated by the node, more
specifically, the sequence of L
p
IPDs is the medium where we hide the provenance of
the packets. We denote the set of IPDs by DS = { [1], [2], ..., [L
p
] }, where  [j]
represents the IPD between j-th and (j+1)-th data packet. The data source encodes
a bit of its PN sequence over each IPD. Throughout the transmission of a packet
towards the BS, each intermediate node also encodes 1-bit of provenance information
over the associated IPD. Hence, an IPD recorded at the BS carries the sum of 1-bit
information from each node in the path. The process also uses the secret K
i
and a
locally generated random number ↵
i
(known as impact factor). The BS only knows
the distribution of the ↵
i
’s. The process a node n
i
follows to encode a bit of PN
sequence over an IPD is summarized below:
1. Generation of Delay Perturbations: n
i
generates a set of delay pertur-
bations by using the PN sequence pni and impact factor ↵i. ↵i is a random (real)
number generated according to a normal distribution N(µ,  ). µ and   are pre-
determined and known to the BS and all the nodes. Thus, the BS only knows the
distribution of ↵
i
’s, but not their exact values. However, n
i
generates the set of delay
perturbations V
i








































[j] corresponds to the provenance bit pn
i
[j]. However, the node may
perform the computation o✏ine since it is independent of any packet specific infor-
mation.
2. Selection of a Delay Perturbation: On the arrival of any (j + 1)   th
data packet, n
i




] 2 V to
it. To ensure the robustness of the scheme, the delay perturbations are not assigned
sequentially to the IPDs i.e. v
i





] is selected using the secret K
i
and the packet timestamp. The algorithm uses
the following formula





Here, H is a lightweight, secure hash function, k is the concatenation operator, and
ts[j + 1] represents the packet timestamp. Since secure hash functions generate uni-
formly distributed message digests, each execution of the selection mechanism will
result in a unique integer in the range [0, L
p
  1]. The resulting integer can be used
to index a distinct element in V
i
.
As part of the provenance encoding process, each node executes the algorithm once
for each of the L
p
IPDs returning a set of indices as the permutation of integers from 0
to L
p
 1. The indices are used to point the elements in V
i
. Thus, the order according
to which each node embeds the delays from V
i
over the IPDs forms a permutation













[k1], vi[k2], ..., vi[kL
p
]}. Note that, given an IPD, the
algorithm will select di↵erently indexed delays for di↵erent nodes based on the keyK
i
.
Thus, an attacker cannot predict the IPD-to-Delay Perturbation assignment without




. Keeping the provenance length secret is not a
requirement but keeping it secret makes it harder for an attacker to regenerate the
selections.
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3. Provenance Embedding: In this step, n
i













], through this step
a provenance bit is embedded over an IPD. This notion makes our scheme reminiscent
of watermarking. we present the provenance embedding algorithm into two steps:
(i) Simple Provenance Embedding: As shown in Fig. 5.1(a), the simple prove-
nance is represented as a simple path. Each node in the path watermarks its PN




+ 1) packets are utilized. Intuitively, the first
packet in a data flow does not experience any delay due to provenance embedding.
For any other (j +1)  th data packet (sent/forwarded), each node in the path hides
a provenance bit over the associated IPD  [j]. Interchangeably, a node n
i
uses the















where T is the value of a time unit. If s
i
[j] > 0, the resulting  
i
[j] > 0 and then we
can perform watermarking by simply adding  
i
[j] to  [j]. But if s
i
[j] < 0, the delay
to be added to an IPD is negative. To avoid this situation, we introduce a constant
o↵set when calculating  
i
[j], which ensures that  
i
[j] is always positive. The o↵set
may be any constant leading to  
i
[j] > 0. We use (µ + const ⇤  ) in our scheme,
where const is any constant that makes  
i















then performs watermarking by adding  
i
[j] to  [j] i.e. delaying the packet
transmission by  
i
[j] time. Thus, n
i
formulates the watermarked IPD  w[j] and
transmission time of the (j+1)-th packet t0
i
[j + 1] as follows





[j + 1] = t
i
[j + 1] +  
i
[j] + c (5.7)
where c is a constant > 0 corresponding to the delay added by a sensor node, including
processing and any other delay. After watermarking, n
i
sends the (j +1)  th packet
towards the BS at instant t0
i
[j + 1]. Throughout the transmission, all other nodes in
the provenance embed one bit of provenance information over the IPD following the
same procedure.
(ii) Aggregate Provenance Embedding: Figure 5.1(b) shows the aggregate
provenance, represented as a tree. Assume that in an aggregate provenance tree, n
a
is
the aggregator possessing U children n
l1 , nl2 , ..., nl
U
. At any (j+1) th sensing interval
(1  j  L
p
), the child nodes send data to n
a
embedding their provenance information






computes the aggregated data, attaches authenticated
timestamp from one of its children, and also maintains the corresponding IPD in such
a way that this delay represents the provenance embedding for the aggregator and










[j] to the unwatermarked IPD, where  
a
[j] represents the watermark
delay computed by the aggregator. The  
l
i
[j]’s can be approximated by the aggregator
from the IPD observations while data is being received from the corresponding child.
However, this scheme would impose a major delay to the aggregated data which would
abruptly reduce data throughput. To address this problem, we propose a di↵erent
solution based on some mathematical tricks.
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of child nodes, n
a




















[j] in Eq. (5.8) may also be negative. So, we also add the constant o↵set to make
 
A
[j] always positive. The reason why this solution works is explained in sec. 5.2.2.
By following the above procedure, each node in the flow path encodes its 1-bit
information. Consequently, the provenance bits are watermarked over the L
p
IPDs
by manipulating them with corresponding delay perturbations, termed as watermark
delay. This way, DS is transformed into the watermarked version DSw. However,
data packets may also experience di↵erent propagation delays or attacks aimed at
destroying the provenance information. At the end, the BS receives the dataset along
with watermarked IPDs DSw, which can be interpreted as the sum of delays imposed
by the intermediate nodes, the attackers, and the di↵erence between consecutive
propagation delays along the data path. Thus, DSw represents the DSSS encoded
signal in our context.
5.2.2 Provenance Decoding
The provenance retrieval algorithm recovers provenance using the secret parame-
ters including the keys {K1, K2, ..., Kn}, the PN length Lp, and the optimal threshold
T ⇤. The threshold, corresponding to the network diameter and PN length, is cal-
culated once after the deployment of the network. The way how to calculate this
decoding threshold is described below in section 5.2.3.
The BS records the watermarked IPDs and executes the retrieval process whenever
it collects a number of L
p
IPDs denoted by the set DSw. Since the BS does not know
which nodes embedded their identities in the provenance, it executes the process for
all of the nodes in the network and tries to identify the desired nodes. For each
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node, the BS generates a node specific sequence of real numbers by reordering the
IPDs in DSw according to the bit selection algorithm. We denote such a sequence
by CSi = {csi[1], csi[2], ... , cs[Lp]}. Any element (i.e. IPD) in this sequence can
be interpreted as the sum of delays added by the nodes in provenance, the di↵erence
of propagation delay between two consecutive data packets, and possibly any delay











 tr(k , k+1)[m] +D[m] (5.9)
where tr
k , k+1 is the di↵erence between the propagation delays of two consecutive
data packets from k-th intermediate node to (k+1)-th node and D[m] is any delay















 tr(k , k+1)[m] +D[m] (5.10)
As (µ + const ⇤  ) ⇥ T is a constant, the sum over this constant can be denoted
as another constant Tc. To determine whether a node contributes to a data flow,

















































[j] = 0. Due to this special property of pni, any constant delay added during
watermarking will contribute a 0 to the cross-correlation. For the same reason, adding
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) during aggregation instead of  
l
i




, if added, would have been eliminated from the cross-correlation.
Note that, the last two terms, representing di↵erence in propagation delays and
attacker induced delays, are negligible compared to the first term i.e. ideal cross-
correlation value. So, the inclusion of the node in provenance can be decided correctly
by a comparison of R
i
with T ⇤. If R
i
  T ⇤, the identity of this node was embedded i.e.
the node contributed to data flow. Otherwise, the node did not participate. After
successfully retrieving the provenance information, the BS resets DSw and starts
collecting IPDs for future provenance retrievals.
The decoding error can be reduced further by embedding the provenance, i.e.
each v[j] 2 V , multiple times. The number of repetitions is called redundancy factor.
At the BS, the provenance is extracted multiple times and the decision about the
presence of a node in the provenance is taken based on a majority voting technique.
Thus, the e↵ect of any unusual propagation delay or malicious attacks is mitigated.
Besides, the knowledge of diameter H of the sensor network can be used to determine
the nodes in the data flow path more accurately by selecting H nodes with the highest
cross-correlation values.
5.2.3 Decoding Threshold Evaluation
This section presents the evaluation of an optimal threshold T ⇤ that minimizes the
probability of decoding error which is defined as the probability of retrieving prove-
nance incorrectly. Let P
err
, P1, and P0 represent the probability of decoding error,
probability that a node embeds its identity (i.e. PN sequence) in the provenance and





ity of embedding and retrieval of a node’s PN sequence, respectively (p
e
= 1 implies
that the PN sequence of a node was embedded, p
r
= 1 implies the PN sequence
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= 1)P1 + P (pr = 1|pe = 0)P0
= P (r < T |p
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To minimize the probability of decoding errors (P
err
), we take the first order derivative
of P
err




















= P1f(T |pe = 1)  P0f(T |pe = 0) (5.13)
The distributions f(r|p
e
= 0) and f(r|p
e





, respectively. The experimental observations of cross-correlation for
the nodes present in the provenance are stored in a set R
e
and for those that are
not present are stored in R0
e




show that the distributions
f(r|p
e
= 0) and f(r|p
e
= 1) can be estimated as Gaussian distributions N(µ0,  0) and
N(µ1,  1) respectively. However, the following analysis can still be performed with








0 | and P1 = 1  P0.
Substituting the Gaussian expressions for f(r|p
e
= 0) and f(r|p
e
= 1) in Eq. 5.13





























The roots of this equation give the optimal threshold T ⇤ that minimizes P
err
. The
second order derivative of P
err







2 > 0) is met. To show the high dependency of the
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probability of decoding errors on the choice of decoding threshold T ⇤, we conducted
experiments with a sensor network of diameter 12 and PN Length = 240 bits. The




obtained from the experiment
are reported in Fig. 5.4(a). The optimal computed threshold T ⇤ is indicated by the
dotted vertical line. As we can see from Fig. 5.4(a), the two distributions are far
apart which is a direct result of using the competing objects for b
i
equal to 1 and
0. Fig. 5.4(b) shows the probability of decoding error for di↵erent values of the
threshold, which in turn shows the presence of an optimal threshold that minimizes
the probability of decoding error.

























= 1) and the optimal
threshold T ⇤ = 0.0303




















(b) Experimental values of P
err
for dif-
ferent decoding threshold (T ) values
Fig. 5.4.: Decoding Threshold Evaluation for Provenance Watermarking Scheme
5.2.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security and resiliency of our provenance scheme
against various outside and inside attackers.
Outside Attacker
With the capability of capturing data packets and inter-packet timing character-
istics, an outside attacker may try to disrupt provenance security in di↵erent ways.
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Provenance detection and retrieval: An attacker might want to identify and
extract the provenance embedded by a node. Several attacks have been devised to
detect and corrupt the active timing-based watermark in network flows. Cabuk et
al. implement a covert network timing channel which transmits one packet in a time
interval to encode the bit ’1’ and stays silent for a ’-1’ bit [32]. Such a static encoding
of messages leads to a highly regular behavior in the inter-packet delays, whereas
overt tra c arrives anytime, resulting in an irregular pattern. Cabuk et al. show how
to detect the covert channel by identifying a regular pattern in the IPDs. However,
in our scheme, the watermarked IPDs do not follow any regular pattern, rather the
IPDs appear random in nature and it is hard to distinguish the patterns generated
by the watermarking from natural variation in tra c rates. Hence, our scheme can
evade detection based on regularities in data tra c [32].
Peng et al. develop an attack technique [37] to detect, recover, duplicate or re-
move a message, watermarked in a flow according to the scheme proposed in [34].
The attacker tries to infer important watermarking parameters (such as quantization
step used to compute watermark delay, proportion of watermarked IPDs etc.) using
packet timestamps at each intermediate host and achieves the attack goals utiliz-
ing these parameters. Since our watermarking recovery process uses every IPD for
watermarking purpose, this attack process does not help an attacker in extracting
the provenance, embedded according to our scheme. Moreover, the lack of clock
synchronization between nodes will weaken this attack.
Luo et al. propose an approach to detect and autonomously remove spread spec-
trum flow watermarks (SSFW) [80]. Since the encoder needs to throttle the flow’s
throughput to a low value for a given period T
c
for embedding a ’-1’ and spreading
the watermark using PN codes increases the number of such low-throughput peri-
ods significantly, the SSFW causes an abnormal sequence of low-throughput periods
(large delays) in the flow. Hence, the attacker can detect the SSFW by identifying
the presence of anomalous sequences of low-throughput periods. Kiyavash et al. have
devised a multi-flow attack to detect the SSFW [36] based on the observation of long
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low-throughput period on several flows compared to a trained model. Compared to
existing SSFW techniques, our scheme uses low amplitude watermarks i.e. much
smaller delays (on the order of few milliseconds) that appear close to natural network
jitter. It makes the provenance invisible to attackers and thus prevents the attackers
from detecting and removing the provenance. In our system, each node possesses
unique provenance information that is watermarked in the flow and also the em-
bedding position of the provenance bits is changed continuously. Thus, a multi-flow
attack cannot defeat our scheme.
It is important to notice that these attacks mainly focus on detecting whether
a data flow has a secretely embedded watermark and, if present, then on recov-
ering/removing it. On the contrary, the attacker in our context might have prior
knowledge about the fact that a timing-based provenance watermarking scheme is
applied in the sensor network. Also we are not considering the complete removal
of provenance as well. Therefore, attacks conducted to only detect the existence of
provenance will not help the attacker anyway, unless the attacker can retrieve the
provenance information of a node. In addition, most of these attacks are addressed
to specific watermarking techniques and hence cannot be generalized to disrupt any
watermarking scheme. However, the following claim shows that our scheme can evade
such detection and retrieval attacks
However, a statistical test, based on the assumption that IPDs of covert tra c
center on limited numbers of distinct values instead of being randomly distributed [81],
can detect the presence of provenance in the time domain. The reason is that the mean
of watermark delays for ’1’ and ’-1’ bits converges to two separate values in our scheme.
Still, an attacker cannot retrieve the provenance information of a node by observing
the IPDs of flows from/to that node. The embedding positions of provenance bits
are changed in every round of embedding based on the packet timestamp and they
also di↵er from node to node. Hence, given a sequence of L
p
IPDs, the attacker has
to try all combinations of these numbers to get the order of bits in the provenance
information. For example, given 120 delays for a 120 bit provenance information
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the original sequence of provenance bits.
Replay Attack: An adversary may replay previously heard data packets (trans-
mitted by legitimate nodes) to give a false idea about the sensed environment [82]. For
an IPD based provenance transmission system (like ours), the attacker also observes
the timing characteristics in order to maintain them during packet replay. To make
the replayed data appear as fresh, the attacker will update the packet timestamp to a
recent value. Nevertheless in our scheme, the selection of provenance bit for any j-th
IPD depends on the timestamp of (j+1)-th packet and thus changes with the varying
timestamp. So, sustaining the old time observations while marking the packet with
a new timestamp does not allow the BS to extract provenance successfully. Conse-
quently, the provenance integrity check fails and the data is discarded.
Inside Attacker
An inside attacker may want to generate fake data and construct the provenance
including some innocent nodes {n
i1 , ni2 , ..., ni
U
} in order to mark them as untrust-
worthy by making them responsible for false data. However, this attack will fail since
the provenance embedding process requires node-specific secrets, like the PN code,
the secret key, and the impact factor, and the attacker does not know these for the
uncompromised nodes.
Provenance Modification Attack: An attacker, acting alone or colluding with
others, may want to add or remove nodes from the provenance of data generated by




are compromised nodes and collude to execute
the attack. A benign data item d, with provenance p
d
= {n





which wants to remove n
i2 from pd and replace it with nm. To remove ni2
from provenance, n
e
has to remove the delays added by n
i2 from IPDs. Since negative
delays cannot be added, n
e
will adjust the j-th IPD by delaying the j-th packet which
decreases the delay introduced to the (j + 1)  th packet for provenance embedding.
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The amount of delay to be added can be found by observing the timing characteristics
of packets to and from n
i2 . Note that ne has to adjust the IPDs in reverse order, from
j = L
p
to 1. To achieve this, n
e
has to accumulate all the (L
p
+ 1) packets, adjust
their IPDs, and then transmit these packets towards the BS maintaining the adjusted
timings. Such an attack scheme will add too much delay to the packets, which will





in the provenance if they collude. However, the provenance integrity check at the
BS will fail and detect an attack.
Forgery: Our scheme can also detect provenance forgery i.e. given the valid
provenance for a data packet, the attacker cannot associate this provenance with a
data packet with a di↵erence provenance. A malicious routing node n
e
can perform
two types of attack:
Forgery attack 1. Suppose that the data packet d belongs to a data flow generated
by a benign node n
s












with a fake packet d
e
. To achieve this, n
e
tries to insert d
e
in the
flow while maintaining the observed timing characteristics. However, to certify that
d
e




must generate the MAC of the data value
and timestamp by using the secret key of n
s




cannot generate the MAC.
Forgery attack 2. d1, d2 belong to two di↵erent data flows generated by ns1 and
n
s2 , respectively. ne swaps the data value of these packets. Hence, the BS will now
identify n
s2 as a part of the provenance for d1 whereas d1 contains the MAC generated
by n
s1 .
Hence, the data integrity check will detect the provenance forgery in both cases.
Unauthorized Access: Only authorized parties can access and check the in-
tegrity of provenance. This follows from the provenance decoding process which re-
quires the PN sequences and secret keys of all nodes in the network (at least for nodes
in the provenance). Only the authorized party (the BS in our case) that has access
to these information can retrieve the provenance and thereafter check the integrity.
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From the above security analysis it follows that an adversary cannot access or
modify the provenance without being detected. However, modifications may destroy
the provenance and impact the robustness of the scheme. The strength of our scheme
is that, with some redundancy and detection mechanism, it can recover the provenance
upto a great extent. We consider the following attacks by compromised nodes:
Deletion Attack: A compromised node can destroy the information carried out
by the IPDs by dropping data packets routed through it. Dropping any j-th data
packet consumes the (j-1)th and j-th IPD. However, we can mitigate this attack by
embedding the provenance multiple times and employing the majority voting tech-
nique when retrieving the provenance, as discussed in sec. 5.2.2. The impact and
e↵ectiveness of the redundancy factor (i.e. how many times the provenance is embed-
ded) on provenance recovery is evaluated and reported in Fig. 5.5(c)
Alteration Attack: This attack perturbs the IPDs with the goal of moving the
cross-correlation values from above the threshold T ⇤ to below the threshold T ⇤ and
vice versa, leading the erroneous retrieval of provenance. As in the deletion attack,
embedding provenance multiple times will reduce the impact of this attack. However,
the attacker may try to change the IPDs within a safe range, since an alteration to
an IPD beyond a certain limit would be recognized by the BS as an attack. Such a
modification, however, would a↵ect the cross-correlation value negligibly, thus leaving
the provenance decoding process undisturbed.
Insertion Attack: A malicious routing node may insert fake data in the data
flow generated by a legitimate node. Through the MAC verification or using some
standard detection mechanism, the BS can detect such false data packets and discard
them. Thus, an insertion attack will have almost no e↵ect on the provenance decoding.
5.2.5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the scalability and robustness of our scheme. For the experiments,
we simulate the sensor network as a tree with diameter H. The network consists
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of 1000 nodes with default values of H = 8, and L
p
= 160 bits. Other parameters
include µ = 5,   = 0.005, const = 100, time unit = 5 ms, and redundancy factor = 1.
Sensor data is generated every 5 seconds. For each experiment, the simulations were
run 100 times.


























(a) Delays incurred due to provenance em-
bedding
















































Redundancy Factor = 3 
Redundancy Factor = 10
(c) Resilience to Deletion attack




















Redundancy Factor = 1
Redundancy Factor = 10
(d) Resilience to Insertion attack
Fig. 5.5.: Performance of provenance watermarking scheme
Scalability
The scalability of our solution is evaluated by quantizing the impact of H on
the overall delay due to provenance embedding. The reason why we investigate the
relationship of delay to the network diameter instead of the number of nodes is that
the provenance length increases linearly with the diameter. In comparison, the e↵ect
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of the total number of nodes is much lower. Fig. 5.5(a) shows a comparison of natural
IPDs with the watermarked IPDs. The watermarked IPD increases from natural
IPD by a maximum of 6%.The graph also shows that the watermarked IPD linearly
increases with H though the increasing rate is not high.
As the diameter of sensor network has a direct influence on the PN length, one has
to determine the optimal PN length for a particular H that ensures a low decoding
error. Fig. 5.5(b) reports the percentage of the provenance decoding error for di↵erent
PN lengths with varying network diameters. Predictably, an increase in the PN length
results in a decrease of the decoding error for a particular diameter as well as the
increase in diameter imposes a higher error rate for a particular PN length.
Provenance Recovery
These experimental results show how well the decoding process can recover the
provenance against various attacks discussed in sec. 7.1.2.
Deletion Attack: The adversary randomly drops ↵ data packets (of a data flow)
routed through it. The provenance is then decoded and the decoding error is measured
for di↵erent ↵ values as reported in Fig. 5.5(c). We evaluated the performance of our
scheme for various redundancy factors. The decoding error decreases with increasing
values of the redundancy factor.
Alteration Attack: We evaluated the performance of our decoding technique against
two types of alteration attacks namely, fixed and random (↵,  ) alteration attacks.
In the fixed-(↵,  ) alteration attack, the attacker randomly selects ↵2 data packets
and delays them by multiplying the corresponding IPDs by (1 +  ). Consequently,
each following IPD (total ↵2 ) is decreased by (1   ). Here,   is a fixed value. In the
random-(↵,  ) attack, the IPDs are multiplied by (1 + x), where x is a uniform ran-
dom variable 2 [0,  ]. Figures 5.6(a)(b)(c) show the behavior of our scheme against
the fixed-(↵,  ) alteration attack. In Fig. 5.6(a), as the percentage of IPDs altered



























(a) Fixed-(↵, ) alter attack:
Decoding errors cors. to vari-
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(c) Fixed-(↵, ) alter attack:
Decoding errors cors. to the


























(d) Random-(↵, ) alter attack:
Decoding errors cors. to various
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(e) Random-(↵, ) alter attack:
Decoding errors against  























(f) Random-(↵, ) alter attack:
Decoding errors cors. to the
rate of IPD alterations
Fig. 5.6.: Resilience to fixed-(↵,  ) and random-(↵,  ) alter attacks
seems surprisingly resilient. The provenance decoding error shows low increases for
increasing percentages of altered IPDs (b) or the alteration factor (c). Similar results
were experienced for the random-(↵,  ) attack as shown in Figures 5.6(d)(e)(f).
Insertion Attack: In this experiment, we insert ↵ data packets in the flow i.e.
add ↵ IPDs. Utilizing our detection mechanism, we can achieve an almost constant
decoding error while varying the percentage of inserted IPDs. Fig. 5.5(d) shows the
robustness of our solution against the insertion attack.
5.3 Bloom Filter based Provenance Scheme
To enable per-packet provenance transmission for sensor data, we propose a light-
weight distributed scheme relying on in-packet Bloom filters [83] to encode prove-
nance. In addition, we introduce e cient mechanisms for provenance verification and
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(a) Provenance encoding scheme (b) Provenance processing work-
flow at the BS upon receiving a
packet
Fig. 5.7.: iBF based provenance scheme
reconstruction at the BS. Each packet consists of a unique sequence number, data
value, and an iBF which holds the provenance. We focus on transmitting provenance
graph vertices over an iBF.
We emphasize that our focus is on securely transmitting provenance to the BS. In
an aggregation infrastructure, securing the data values is also an important aspect,
but that has been already addressed in previous work (e.g., [84]). Our secure prove-
nance technique can be used in conjunction with existing work to obtain a complete
solution that provides security for data, provenance and data-provenance binding.
5.3.1 Provenance Encoding
For a data packet, provenance encoding refers to generating the vertices in the
provenance graph and inserting them into the iBF. Each vertex originates at a node
in the data path and represents the provenance record of the host node. A vertex is
uniquely identified by the vertex ID (VID). The VID is generated per-packet based
on the packet sequence number (seq) and the secret key K
i
of the host node. We use
a block cipher function to produce this ID in a secure manner. Thus for a given data
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packet, the VID of a vertex representing the node n
i
is computed with a secure block









Whenever a source node generates a data packet, it also creates a BF (referred
to as ibf0), initialized to all 0’s. The source then generates a vertex according to
Eq. 5.15, inserts the VID into ibf0 and transmits the BF as a part of the packet.
Upon receiving the packet, each intermediate node n
j
performs data as well as
provenance aggregation. If n
j
receives data from a single child n
j 1, it aggregates the
partial provenance contained in the packet with its own provenance record. In this
case, the iBF ibf
j 1 belonging to the received packet represents a partial provenance
i.e. the provenance graph of the sub-path from the source upto n
j 1. On the other
hand, if n
j
has more than one child, it generates an aggregated provenance from
its own provenance record and the partial provenance received from its child nodes.
At first, n
j
computes a BF ibf(j 1) by bitwise-ORing the iBFs received from the
children. ibf
j 1 represents a partial but aggregated provenance from all of the child
nodes. In either case, the ultimate aggregated provenance is generated by encoding
the provenance record of n
j
into ibf(j 1). To this end, nj creates a vertex using
Eq. 5.15, inserts the VID into ibf(j 1) which is then referred to as ibfj.
When the packet reaches the BS, the iBF contains the provenance records of all
the nodes in the path i.e. the full provenance. We denote this final record by ibf .
Example: We illustrate the encoding mechanism by using the example network in
Fig. 5.7(a). The data path considered is < 1, 4, 7 >, where node 1 is the data source.
We use a 10-bit BF and a set of 3 hash functions H = {h1, h2, h3} for BF operations.
When node 1 generates a data packet with sequence number seq, it creates the BF
ibf0 which is set to all 0’s. The node then creates a vertex corresponding to its
provenance record and computes the VID as vid1 = EK1(seq). To insert vid1 into
ibf0, node 1 generates three indices as h1(vid1) = 1, h2(vid1) = 3, h3(vid1) = 8. The
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VID is then inserted by setting ibf0[1], ibf0[3], and ibf0[8] to 1. The updated ibf0
along with the packet is then sent towards the BS.
Upon receiving the packet, node 4 performs data and provenance aggregation.
Since the node has one child, it only aggregates its own provenance record with ibf0.
For this purpose, the node generates a VID vid4; computes 3 indices as h1(vid4) = 3,
h2(vid4) = 6, h3(vid4) = 9; and inserts vid4 into ibf0 by setting bits 3, 6, 9 of the
iBF to 1. This updated iBF is referred to as ibf1. The data packet with ibf1 is then
forwarded to node 7 which repeats the provenance aggregation steps. At the end, the
BS receives the packet with the final iBF (ibf2 from node 7) and stores this iBF for
further processing.
5.3.2 Provenance Decoding
When the BS receives a data packet, it executes the provenance verification pro-
cess, which assumes that the BS knows what the data path should be, and checks the
iBF to see whether the correct path has been followed. However, right after network
deployment, as well as when the topology changes (e.g., due to node failure), the path
of a packet sent by a source may not be known to the BS. In this case, the provenance
collection process is executed, which retrieves provenance from the received iBF and
thus the BS learns the data path from a source node. Afterwards, upon receiving a
packet, it is su cient for the BS to verify its knowledge of provenance with that in
the packet. Below we discuss these two processes in more details:
Provenance Verification: The BS conducts the verification process not only to
verify its knowledge of provenance but also to check the integrity of the transmitted
provenance. Algorithm 1 shows the steps to verify provenance for a given packet. We
assume that the knowledge of the BS about this packets path is P . At first, the BS
initializes a Bloom filter BF
c
with all 0’s. The BF is then updated by generating the
VID for each node in the path P and inserting this ID into the BF. BF
c
now reflects
the perception of BS about the encoded provenance. To validate its perception, the
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BS then compares BF
c
to the received iBF ibf . The provenance verification succeeds
only if BF
c
is equal to ibf . Otherwise, if BF
c
di↵ers from the received iBF, it indicates
either a change in the data flow path or a BF modification attack. The verification
failure triggers the provenance collection process which attempts to retrieve the nodes
from the encoded provenance and also to distinguish between the events of a path
change and an attack.
Algorithm 1 ProvenanceVerification
Input: Received packet with sequence seq and iBF ibf.
Set of hash functions H, Data path P 0 = < n0
l1
























return true // Provenance is verified
endif
return false
Provenance Collection: As illustrated in Algorithm 2, the provenance collection
scheme makes a list of potential vertices in the provenance graph through the ibf
membership testing over all the nodes. For each node n
i
in the network, the BS




) using Eq. 5.15. The BS then
performs the membership query of vid
i
within ibf . If the algorithm returns true, the
vertex is very likely present in provenance, i.e., the host node n
i
in the data path.
Such an inference might introduce errors because of false positives (a node not on the
route is inferred to be on the route). However, as shown in Section 5.3.3, the false
positive probability obtained is very low.
Once the BS finalizes the set of potential candidate nodes S =< n0
l1






it executes the provenance verification algorithm on this set. This step is required
to distinguish between the cases of a legitimate route change and that of malicious
activity. If the verification succeeds, we decide that there was a natural change in
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the data path and we have been able to determine the path correctly. Otherwise, an
attack has occurred.
Algorithm 2 ProvenanceCollection
Input: Received packet with sequence seq and iBF ibf.
Set of nodes (N) in the network, Set of hash functions H
1. Initialize
Set of Possible Nodes S  <>
Bloom Filter BF
c
 0 // To represent S
2. Determine possible nodes in the path and build the representative BF










is in ibf) then















return S // Provenance has been determined correctly
else
return NULL // Indicates an in-transit attack
endif
A possible attack is the all-one attack where all bits in the provenance are set to
1, which implies the presence of all nodes in the provenance. To address the issue,
we use a density metric   introduced in [38].   reflects the number of 1’s in the
provenance (i.e. the iBF) as a fraction of the total size. To consider the provenance
valid, we require that the density is equal or below a certain threshold:     
max
.
Such a requirement is reasonable since in a BF with n elements and k hash functions,
there may be at most kn bits marked as ’1’. Hence, we can always find an upper
bound for the number of 1’s in a BF. Thus, the maximum number of allowable 1’s
is m 
max
. Within this bound, an attacker may also randomly flip some bits to add
or delete a legitimate node. The chance of being successful in this attack is very
small since the attacker has to identify k bit positions corresponding to the node,
which again change for each packet. If each bit is guessed randomly, the probability
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that the attacker guesses all of them correctly is given by 12m . Moreover, an attempt
of blindly altering some bits is detected since the verification process at the end of
the provenance collection phase does not succeed. A successful attack occurs when
the bits set by the attacker (limited by  
max
) make all the k bits corresponding to a
legitimate node turn out to be ’1’. If the data provenance includes n nodes, the kn
hash results may map to at least one and at most m 
max
bits. Thus a smart attacker
marks upto (m 
max














Randomly guessing one of them has 1
B
chance of success. Hence, the success in
manipulation attack has a very small probability. The workflow shown in Fig. 5.7(b)
summarizes the provenance decoding process.
5.3.3 Performance Analysis
We present an analysis of the space and energy overhead of the proposed scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, no secure provenance scheme has been proposed for
sensor networks. Hence, we use the following two benchmarks:
(i) We adapt the generic secure provenance framework SProv [15] to sensor net-
works. In this lightweight version of the scheme, referred to as SSP , we simplify the













cryptographic hash of the updated data, and C
i







(ii) We also consider a MAC-based provenance scheme, referred to as MP, where
a node transmits the nodeID and a MAC computed on it as the provenance record.
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Space Complexity
To implement SSP, we use SHA-1 (160 bit) for cryptographic hash operations
and the TinyECC library [85] to generate 160-bit digital signatures (ECDSA). The
nodeID has length 2 bytes, thus the length of each provenance record is 42 bytes. For
MP, we use TinySec library [86] to compute a 4-byte CBC-MAC. Hence, a provenance
record has 6 bytes in this case. As each node in the path encodes its own provenance
record, the provenance size increases linearly with the number of hops. For a D-hop
path, the provenance is 42D bytes in SSP and 6D bytes in MP.
Since our approach is based on BF, the provenance length depends on parameter












is the total number of distinct elements in the element space, n is the number
of elements actually encoded in the BF and n
a
is the number of elements retrieved by
querying the BF. Let m be the BF size, k the number of hash functions and D the
maximum number of nodes in any path. The false positive probability is equal to that
of getting 1 in all the k array positions computed by the hash functions while querying
the membership of an element that was not inserted in the BF. This probability is
P
fp
= (1  (1  1
m
)kD)k ⇡ (1  e  kDm )k (5.18)
For a given m and D, the number of hash functions that minimizes the false positives








Given D and a desired false positive probability P
fp
, the required number of bits






⇤ (ln2)2 ) m =  D ⇤ ln(Pfp)
(ln2)2
(5.20)
This means that in order to maintain a fixed false positive probability, the length of a
BF should grow with the number of elements to be inserted. If we consider P
fp
= 0.02
and a 14-hop path, the BF size m is computed as 114 bits and k
opt
= 6. Thus, a
120-bit (15 byte) BF is su cient to encode provenance while maintaining low false
positives. In practice, we bound P
fp
by a small constant   (> 0) such that P
fp
<  .
To find the appropriate value of m we have
ln(P
fp
) > ln  )  m
D






For a D-hop path, SSP has to transmit 42⇤D bytes (= 336⇤D bits), MP transmits
6 ⇤ D bytes (= 48 ⇤ D bits) whereas our scheme requires m bits transmitted. SSP,




(ln2)2 ⇤D, respectively. Although all of the terms are proportional to D, the constant
coe cient in the first two terms are much larger than the last one. For example, if we
set   = 10 4 then the coe cient in our scheme is 19.17 which is much smaller than
the coe cients in SSP and MP. Another part of overhead comes from the signature,
MAC and hash computations. However, in sensor networks, usually computation




Confidentiality. Provenance is encoded using BF hashing functions, and the
hashed value takes into account the secret key K
i
of each node as part of the vertex
VIDs (Eq. 5.15), as well as a unique sequence number. Hence, even if an attacker
collects a large sample of iBFs, it cannot perform a dictionary attack without knowing
the node secret key.
Integrity. First, an attacker cannot add legitimate nodes to the provenance of
data generated by the compromised nodes. Assume the attacker attempts to frame
some uncompromised nodes < n
l
, n1, n2, . . . , np > to make them responsible for false
data. Provenance embedding requires the node secret key K
i
to compute the V ID
i
,
which the attacker does not have. Hence, the attack is not successful.
Second, an attacker cannot selectively add or remove nodes from the provenance





to execute an attack. A benign packet with provenance < n
l





attempts to remove n2 from the provenance and to replace
it with another legitimate node n2. When the packet reaches ne , it contains the
partial provenance < n
l
, ..., n1, ..., ne > encoded in the iBF ibfpp. To remove n2
from provenance, at first n
e
has to construct the Bloom filter BF2 containing the
provenance record of n2. The bitwise-AND of the negated value of BF2 with ibfpp
removes the information of n2 from the provenance. Assume the modified iBF is
ibf
pp
. To add n02 to the provenance after the removal of n2, the BF corresponding
to n2 should be built and then OR-ed with ibf pp. In both cases, the attackers are
unable to construct a BF representing uncompromised nodes, due to the absence of
the secret keys of legitimate nodes.
Freshness. Provenance replay attacks are detected by our proposed scheme, since
provenance is derived using a unique packet sequence number and the secret key of
the node. An attempt to change the sequence number of a packet without having the
key will be detected at the BS, according to the integrity property discussed above.
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5.3.5 Simulation Results
We implemented and tested the proposed technique using the TinyOS simulator
(TOSSIM) [89], and we have used the micaz energy model. We consider a network
of 100 nodes and vary the network diameter from 2 to 14. All results are averaged














































































































































(f) False Positive Rate for various BF sizes
Fig. 5.8.: Performance of the iBF based provenance scheme
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Provenance Decoding Error
The provenance decoding process retrieves the provenance from the in-packet
Bloom filter, and consists of the verification and collection phases. To quantify the
accuracy and e ciency of our provenance scheme, we measure decoding error in both
the above phases, i.e., verification and collection error.
Algorithm 1 shows that the verification fails when the provenance graph in the
packet does not match with the local knowledge at the BS. This may happen when
there is a data flow path change or upon a BF modification attack. Provenance
verification failure rate (VFR) measures the ratio of packets for which verification
fails. Fig. 5.8(a) shows the VFR for paths of 2 to 12 hops with various BF sizes. For
each path length, the VFR is averaged over 1000 distinct paths. The results show
that the provenance verification process fails only for a very small fraction of packets.
Thus, for most packets the lightweight verification process is su cient to retrieve
the provenance. The more costly provenance collection process is executed only for a
very few packets when verification fails. As expected, VFR increases linearly with the
increase of the path length. On the other hand, VFR is not significantly influenced by
BF size, proving that even small BF sizes provide good protection. Fig 5.8(b) shows
the variation of VFR over time, as the number of packet transmissions increases. As
the network gets stable with time, the data paths do not change often, and hence the
VFR approaches 0.
Fig. 5.8(c) and 5.8(d) plot the percentage of provenance collection error for dif-
ferent number of hops and the corresponding false positive rates, respectively. Recall
that, the collection phase is executed when provenance verification fails. Fig. 5.8(e)
and 5.8(f) show the collection error corresponding to various BF sizes and the related
false positives, respectively. The number of hash functions used are determined using
Eq. (5.19). The resulting false positive rates vary from 0 ⇠ 0.013 and it is observed
that the collection error becomes negligible when the false positive rate drops at or
below 10 4. It is also seen that a BF size of 16 bytes is enough to ensure no decoding
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error for up to 8-hop paths. The empirical BF size required is much less than the
theoretical one(⇠ 20 bytes for a 8-hop path).
Space Complexity and Energy Consumption
Fig. 5.9(a) shows a comparison among SSP, MP and our provenance mechanism
in terms of bytes required to transmit provenance. The provenance length in SSP and
MP increases linearly with the path length. For our scheme, we empirically determine
the BF size which ensures no decoding error. Although the BF size increases with
the expected number of elements to be inserted, the increasing rate is not linear. We



















































(b) Aggregate energy consumption
Fig. 5.9.: Space complexity and energy consumption of the provenance scheme
We also measure the energy consumption due to provenance construction and
transmission for various hop counts. Note that, modern sensors use ZigBee specifi-
cation for high level communication protocols which allows upto 104 bytes as data
payload. Hence, SSP and MP can be used to embed provenance (in data
packet) for maximum 2 and 14 nodes, respectively. Figure 5.9(b) compares
the aggregate energy consumption of MP with that of our scheme over 100 packet
transmissions. The results confirm the energy e ciency of our solution.
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6. PROVENANCE USAGE
In this chapter, we demonstrate how the provenance systems designed by us can be
utilized to provide security solutions in various domains. First, we propose a mech-
anism for detecting potential data exfiltration attack, based on the file provenance
information collected by FiPS. Second, we present a provenance based mechanism for
detecting packet dropping adversary in WSNs, utilizing our iBF based provenance
solution. We extend the basic provenance scheme in order to detect packet dropping
activity on the data flow path over a period of time and then to identify malicious
link(s). It is assumed that the links on the path exhibit natural packet loss and several
(colluding) adversarial nodes may exist on the path.
6.1 Detection of Data Exfiltration
The key idea to the detection mechanism is to characterize data exfiltration by
detecting anomalous file access patterns. To distinguish cyber-insider mission actions
from legitimate file activities, we record file provenance, i.e. the history of which
processes wrote to the file, which files were used to modify the file, etc. Based on the
provenance graph built during a training period, we can find the legitimate access
patterns to a file, which help us later on to detect an anomalous access to the file.
Figure 7.2 shows the architecture of the proposed exfiltration detection mechanism.
6.1.1 Training Phase
Since we propose a data-centric approach towards the detection of data exfiltra-
























Fig. 6.1.: Architecture of Data Exfiltration Detection System using File Provenance
phase. In this phase, we assume there is no anomaly in the system and the files are
accessed in order to accomplish regular tasks.
As described earlier, the provenance collector gathers provenance metadata on
a provenance related event and sends o↵ the provenance records to the provenance
processor through a log file. During the training phase, the provenance processor
translates the log data to provenance records, generates appropriate provenance en-
tities and relationships and adds them to the provenance graph of the corresponding
file. The provenance graphs are stored in the provenance database. After the train-
ing period, we expect a robust knowledge of legitimate accesses to files through the
file provenance graphs, which will help us taking a pragmatic approach to detect
anomalous activities later on.
6.1.2 Detection Engine
During normal operation of the system, the provenance processor not only pro-
cesses and stores the provenance information, but also interacts with the detection
engine to detect any anomalous access. When a file is about to be modified, deleted,
etc., the provenance processor generates the access graph of the file in the current
session and reports it to the detection engine. The detection engine then searches for
the given access pattern within the provenance graph of that file, stored in the prove-
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nance database. If the module cannot match the pattern, it indicates a suspicious
access path to the file, which might have been changed or created by an anomaly.
Thus the detection engine raises a flag in this case.
It is to be mentioned that, sensitive data leakage may happen in various ways,
such as, information transfer via USB media, ftp, telnet, email, etc. To be successful
in the mission, an insider attacker may make unauthorized write to OS files, scripts,
and executables, send suspicious outbound tra c, make unauthorized modification
of data in databases, etc. Thus, we have to take care of suspicious writes to not
only regular files, but also many other medias like, USB, network, system file, etc.
The Linux system, however, treats all the peripherals as files. Thus when any write
is about to happen to any of these special purpose files, the detection engine, using
the detection mechanism, tracks the files that are being read and sent o↵ and checks
whether this is legitimate through access pattern search.
6.2 Packet Dropping Adversary Identification in WSNs
In this scheme, we use a packet-acknowledgement based approach which requires
the sensors to transmit more meta-data in the provenance record. For a data packet,
the provenance record generated by a node now consists of the node ID and the
sequence number of the lastly seen (processed/forwarded) packet belonging to that
data flow. If there is an intermediate packet drop, some nodes in the path do not
receive the packet. Hence during the next round of packet transmission, there will
be a mismatch between the acknowledgements (for the lastly seen packet) generated
by the nodes. We utilize this fact to detect the packet dropping attack and then to
localize the malicious link. The detection of a packet loss requires the data source
to securely transmit the sequence number of the packet it generated in the previous
round. The mechanism for detecting packet dropping attack is explained below. For
discussion, we consider the data flow path P =< n
l
, n1, ..., ni, ..., BS}, where nl is the
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only data source and n
d
= BS is the base station. For simplicity, we denote the link
between nodes n
i
and n(i+1) as li.
1. Provenance Encoding: Fig. 6.2 depicts the provenance encoding scheme,
which is a simple extension to the basic scheme. A provenance record here includes
node ID and an acknowledgement to the lastly observed packet of the flow. The
acknowledgement can be generated in various ways to serve the purpose. To keep the
solution simpler, we transmit packet sequence number to acknowledge a packet. For
any j-th packet, a node n
i
creates a vertex v
i
and the vertex ID as follows
vid
i








( seq || pSeq
i
)
where seq is the sequence number attached to the current packet and pSeq
i
is the
stored information at n
i
about the sequence number of the (j 1)-th packet. To update




into the associated iBF. To
Fig. 6.2.: Extended provenance framework to detect packet dropping attack and
identify the malicious link
be noted that, a node must maintain a per-flow record to store the previous packet
sequence for each data flow passed through it. Whenever a node processes/forwards
a packet, it updates the previous packet record of the appropriate data flow with the
recently process packet sequence. If a node receives packet from a data flow for which
it has no packet sequence information, then it may use a pre-specified special purpose
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Fig. 6.3.: Packet loss detection and faulty link identification using provenance.
identifier, such as 0. It addresses the case of routing path change where a new node in
the path can use this special identifier for encoding provenance. Moreover, if a node
does not receive packets from a data flow for a long time, it can erase the previous
packet information for that flow to reduce space overhead. Anyway, the node can
get updated and maintain this record when it receives packets from that flow more
frequently.
2. Provenance Decoding at the BS: The BS also stores the sequence number
of the most recent packet processed for each data flow. Upon receiving a packet, the
BS retrieves the sequence of the last packet transmitted by the source node from the
packet header, fetches the previous packet sequence for the flow from its local storage
and then compares these two sequence numbers. If there is no packet dropping
attack, each node in the path as well as the BS receives all packets in the flow and
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thus possesses the same previous packet sequence. Otherwise, if the BS observes a
di↵erence between these two sequence numbers, it infers about a possible packet loss
and then takes necessary actions to confirm the event and to localize the faulty link.
However, the provenance verification and/or collection are performed according to
the algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. The only di↵erence is that, the BS now creates
the vertex ID corresponding to a node according to the Eq. 6.1.
3. Faulty Link Identification using Provenance: Assume, a data packet d[j]
has been dropped at an intermediate node n
i
. Thus, the nodes n
l
, n1, ..., ni received
d[j] and updated their lastly seen packet sequences to seq[j]. On the contrary, nodes
n
i+1, ..., np as well as the BS did not observe d[j], They have no way to update the
preceding packet sequence but to retain the same old identifier seq[j   1]. Upon
receiving the next packet in the flow, n
l
, n1, ..., ni 1 certainly include seq[j] in the
provenance metadata whereas n
i+1, ..., np use seq[j   1] for this purpose. However,
the malicious node n
i
may either (i) use seq[j], which leads the BS to detect l
i
as
faulty (ii) use seq[j   1], in which case the link l(i 1) is identified as faulty. In any
case, an adjacent link to the malicious node is identified and held responsible for.
Without the loss of generality, we assume that the malicious node encodes seq[j  1].
Figure 6.3 shows the algorithm to identify an earlier packet loss, to localize the
faulty link, and also to ensure that no other attack has been encountered on the
current packet. It uses the received iBF to identify the contributing nodes and to
collect their encoded provenance records. For this purpose, it checks the membership
of all nodes in the network within the iBF using a two step process. The first query is
performed with the previous packet identifier (pSeq) contained in the packet header
and the next one with the sequence number (pSeq
b
) recorded at the BS. Let, the set
of nodes found in the first and second step are respectively S1 = < n0
l
, n01, ..., n
0
(i 1) >




>. The BF constructed with S1 and S2 are BF1 and BF2,
respectively. The final Bloom filter BF
c
is constructed as a bitwise-OR of BF1 and
BF2. If BFc and the received iBF ibf completely matches, the event of a packet loss
is confirmed. In this case, the path constructed on the set of nodes S = S1 U S2 is
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equivalent to the path P as well as S1 = < nl, n1, ..., n(i 1) > and S2 = < ni, ..., np >.
Thus, we can conclude that the link l(i 1) is faulty and causes the packet loss.
4. Certification of Attack: To confirm that the faulty link l(i 1) is actually
malicious (i.e. causes packet dropping attack), the BS observes more packets. When-
ever the BS identifies a packet loss and the responsible link l(i 1), it updates the
empirical loss rate el(i 1) for the link. Assume, the drop rate threshold for a link is ↵,
where ↵ is greater than the natural loss rate of any link. If after a number of packet
transmissions, el(i 1) > ↵, then the BS convicts l(i 1) as a malicious link.
6.2.1 Performance Analysis
Provenance is used to detect a packet loss and to identify the faulty link. Thus the
faulty link detection error depends on the BF parameters and can be analyzed in a
similar way as in sec. 5.3.3. The only di↵erence is that the element space is larger now
due to considering an element as the concatenation of nodeID and a packet sequence.
Hence a larger BF is required to keep the false positive rate small.
Since packet dropping attack directly reduces the amount of legitimate data
throughput, we also analyze our scheme to provide the theoretical bounds for guaran-
teed end-to-end throughput under attacker’s control and also attack detection rate.
Let ⇢
i




’s are i.i.d. random variables
with maximum value ⇢. Let ↵ denotes the per-link drop rate threshold. The theoret-
ical bounds are computed under the converged condition when the empirical loss rate
converges to its true value within a small uncertainty interval. The detection rate
of the proposed scheme i.e. the number of data packets transmitted by the source
before reaching the converged condition is computed in the following theorem




8✏2.(1 ⇢)D packets transmitted by the source to converge.
The following theorem provides a bound on the damage that an adversary can inflict
to the networks end-to-end throughput by the time of detection.
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Theorem 2: Given a path of length D, an adversary in control of z intermediate
links can cause (at most) the z↵ end-to-end packet loss rates without being detected.
6.2.2 Simulation Results
We use simulations to further verify our analysis and to show the e↵ectiveness of
the proposed schemes. The scheme is implemented in TinyOS and the simulations
are conducted using the TinyOS simulator - TOSSIM. We consider a network of 100
nodes where the maximum number of hops vary from 2 to 14. For energy analysis,
PowerTOSSIM z [90] is used which utilizes the micaz energy model. Unless otherwise
stated, the simulation results are averaged over 100 runs.
Fig. 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) show the percentages of provenance collection error and
corresponding false positive rates for the provenance scheme to detect packet drop-
ping attack. Since the element space for the received iBF here increases compared to
the basic scheme, the error rates increase than earlier for the same BF sizes. Since
a very little fraction of packets change the data flow path, provenance verification
process succeeds most of the time and the collection process is executed so infre-
quently. Hence, the collection error does not a↵ect much the accuracy of the faulty
link identification process. The impact of the collection error can further be mini-
mized by getting the order of the nodes in the path using topology knowledge. We
have found that encoding edges greatly helps in this regard by providing the exact
topology information.
Fig. 6.4(c) shows the accuracy of the faulty link identification process over time
and how it leads to the detection of packet dropping attack. The figure plots the link
loss rates over packet transmissions in order to show the convergence of link statistics
to their actual values. For an uncompromised node, the link loss rate should converge
to the natural loss rate whereas for a malicious node the link statistics should tend
towards a significantly higher loss rate which would confirm the packet dropping
attack. For this experiment, we consider an arbitrary 6 hop path where n3 is the
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malicious node and controls the link l3. Natural link loss rate ⇢ = 0.01, malicious
link loss rate ↵ is 0.03, and allowed false positive   = 0.003. The dynamics prove
that eventually the packet dropping attack is detected successfully. However, there
is probability of error since in earlier stage the loss rate of malicious link seems to be
much less than 0.03 while the loss rates of benign links seem high.
Fig. 6.4(d) presents the degradation of data throughput by the time the attack is
detected in case of 1 and 2 malicious nodes deployed. The fraction of dropped tra c
are ⇠ 0.03 and ⇠ 0.055 for 1 and 2 intermediate malicious nodes, respectively. The



























(a) Collection Error for provenance scheme
























(b) False Positive Rate for provenance




















(c) Accuracy of faulty link identification























(d) End-to-end packet drop rate
Fig. 6.4.: Performance of Provenance Scheme Detecting Packet Dropping Attack
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7. A SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE AND
PREVENTION SYSTEM FOR WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are susceptible to operational failures and security
attacks due to resource constraints, unattended operating environment, and com-
munication phenomena. However, WSN applications impose stringent requirements
on reliable and trustworthy data delivery, and service availability. It becomes more
challenging to satisfy these requirements when attackers exploit the insecure and vul-
nerable nature of sensor environments to falsify context, modify access rights, and, in
general, disrupt the system operation [91]. This can result in a wide area blackout, a
patient receiving the wrong treatment, or worse, facing a life risk [92]. Thus, WSNs
must be able to continuously provide their services despite anomalies or attacks and
to e↵ectively recover from attacks without significant interruption.
Over the recent years, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) [49, 93, 94] have been
proposed specifically for WSNs, which cooperatively detect intrusions and report
possible attacks to a central authority. However, these systems are not equipped with
response tools that would enable automatic responses and recovery actions. The
intrusion response systems developed for other domains, such as database systems,
distributed systems, cannot be directly used in WSNs due to significant di↵erences in
their operations, resources, and communication. In the context of WSNs, we need an
intrusion response system that is lightweight in terms of computational cost, and
resource usage. To fulfill this objective, the system should use local and cooperative
strategies instead of heavy interactions with a central authority. Also the response
policies should be specified so not incur much overhead when selecting the appropriate
response actions. Nonetheless, the response system should respond in real-time, yet
execute the most e↵ective action for each anomaly or attack in a secure fashion.
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In this section, we describe Kinesis - the first systematic approach to a security
incident response and prevention system (IRPS) for WSNs. We extend the concept
of traditional intrusion response systems to an extensive response framework that not
only recovers from attacks, but also reacts to anomalies in order to prevent service
disruptions and attacks. The system is lightweight, cooperative, and distributed in
design. According to our design, each sensor in the WSN is a watchdog monitor [49]
and hosts both an IDS, and the Kinesis system. Through the IDS, the monitor
observes neighbor behaviors, detects suspicious incidents (anomaly/attack) in the
neighborhood, and notifies Kinesis. However, Kinesis depends on the IDS only for
the notifications on good/bad neighbor behaviors which is the basic functionality of
an IDS. Upon being notified of an incident, Kinesis matches the appropriate response
policy from the set of response policies specified by the base station (BS).
To support the specification of response policies in Kinesis, we propose a WSN
specific lightweight policy language based on the Event-Condition-Action (ECA)
paradigm [95]. A response policy is defined on an incident and specifies di↵erent
actions based on security assessments of the suspect node. A monitor estimates the
security level of the suspect node based on the (i) incident detection confidence, (ii)
suspect’s behavior history, and (iii) incident impact on the WSN. This strategy helps
selecting the most e↵ective response action at any instant. We have surveyed the
various attacks in WSNs and created a taxonomy of attacks (Fig. 7.1) and a compre-
hensive set of response actions (Table 7.3). However, Kinesis can generate responses
against an unknown attack based on the anomalous behavior the attack manifests.
To trigger the response execution corresponding to an incident, Kinesis selects a
daemon node in a neighborhood via a self-organized competition among the neighbors.
The competition is controlled in a distributed fashion by a per-node action timer.
The node whose timer fires first wins the competition and executes the action. Most
of the actions involve a transmission which is overheard by the neighbors and then
allows the neighbors to stop their action timers and to refrain from taking redundant
actions. Thus, Kinesis does not require any message exchanges for the response action
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synchronization and has no communication overhead. A node’s action timer value
is locally estimated based on: (i) neighborhood size, (ii) neighbor link qualities, (iii)
time since its last action. It reflects the e↵ectiveness of a node in executing the action
and ensures load distribution among the neighbors.
The distributed nature of Kinesis also enhances security. When a node is com-
promised, other legitimate nodes in the neighborhood can continue with the Kinesis
functionalities. Kinesis is secure in terms of policy dissemination and storage since
the BS specifies the policies, converts them to a binary code and disseminates the
binary throughout the network with a secure dissemination protocol [96].
7.1 Background and System Model
7.1.1 Network Model
We consider a multi-hop wireless sensor network, consisting of a number of sensor
nodes and a base station (BS) that collects data from the network. A node is assumed
to have more than one neighbor node which can monitor its behaviors. The BS is
secure and has a secure mechanism to broadcast authentic messages and to dissem-
inate code updates in the network. Sensor nodes are stationary after deployment,
but routing paths may change over time, e.g., due to node failure. Once after the
deployment, the BS assigns each node u a unique nodeID and a cryptographic key
K
u
. Each node also shares a pairwise key K
u,k
with each neighbor k and a group key
K
g
with all the neighbors.
7.1.2 Threat Model and Security Objectives
We consider the BS as trusted, but any other node may be malicious. We assume
a majority of honest nodes in a neighborhood. The WSN maintains the standard
layered architecture of protocol stack which enables typical as well as WSN specific
attacks to these layers. The attacks are directed to impair the following resources: (i)
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Fig. 7.1.: Attack Graph
Network, (ii) Control and data message, (iii) Sensor device resources, e.g. memory,
power, etc. Below, we discuss these attacks with respect to the target resources.
Communication Network: Jamming disrupts a sub-network or even the entire
network. Attacks at the link layer include purposely introduced collisions, resource
exhaustion, and unfairness in medium access.
Messages: In a WSN, all the nodes act as routers. Hence, an attacker may spoof,
alter, or replay routing messages to disrupt network tra c through creating routing
loops, changing routes, attracting or repelling tra c from selected nodes, increasing
latency, etc. Examples include sinkhole, selective forwarding, blackhole, wormhole
attack. While these attacks can also be performed on data packets, additional attacks
like false data injection, and delayed forwarding may be conducted to degrade data
quality and utility.
Sensor Devices: Sensor devices come without tamper-resistant packaging, which
adds the risk of physical attacks, e.g., physical capture, tampering, etc. An adversary
can extract the secrets stored on captured sensors’ chip and cause substantial damage
by exploiting software vulnerabilities. The adversary can also replicate the captured
sensors and place them into network at chosen locations (replication attack). Once
these replicas gain the trust of others, they can launch a variety of insider attacks
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described above. ID spoofing, e.g. Sybil attack, poses threat by enabling a malicious
node to present multiple false identities to the network.
To summarize, attacks may take place in many forms but they disrupt the WSN
by a↵ecting one or more of the above resources. Thus when an anomaly or attack
is detected, our objective is to issue and execute the most e↵ective response actions
in a secure manner so that the WSN su↵ers minimum impact on its resources and
recovers from the attack.
7.1.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
A number of IDSes [49, 93, 94] have been proposed specifically for WSNs that
cooperatively detect intrusions. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels,
overhearing is a natural phenomenon in WSNs. Neighboring nodes overhear trans-
missions from each other, even if they are not the intended recipients [97]. Utilizing
this fact, Marti et al. [49] introduce the watchdog mechanism by which a node identi-
fies a misbehaving neighbor node by observing the neighbor behaviors. Such a node
is termed watchdog monitor (a.k.a monitor). Each monitor observes its neighbors,
collects audit data, and then performs behavioral analysis for each of them to detect
any suspicious activity. The intrusions are cooperatively detected by the monitors
based on their analyses, and a set of pre-defined or adaptive inference rules. The
relationships between the symptoms used by the IDSes and the various attacks are
shown in Figure 7.1.
7.2 Design Overview of Kinesis
In Kinesis, each monitor hosts a distributed IDS and the Kinesis system. Through
the IDS, a monitor observes neighbor behaviors, detects suspicious incidents in the
neighborhood, and notifies Kinesis for automated response action. However, as we see
in section 7.3.3, Kinesis depends on the IDS only for the notifications on good/bad
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behaviors which is the basic functionality of an IDS. Hence, the design or any concern























Fig. 7.2.: Overview of the Kinesis Architecture
Figure 7.2 shows the architecture of Kinesis. The background process Neigh-
bor Observer, with the help of IDS observations, records recent behaviors for each
monitored neighbor and periodically updates the neighbor’s security status based
on this history. Upon detecting an incident, the IDS reports to Kinesis the possible
anomaly/attacks, suspect node(s), and alert confidence for each reported anomaly/attack.
The Action Selector then performs the security assessment of the suspect node based
on the alert confidence, the suspect behavior history, and the incident impact. Based
on the security assessment, the action(s) to be executed are selected dynamically from
the response policy matched on the incident. Due to the incident based approach,
Kinesis can handle unknown attacks based on the anomalous behaviors they manifest.
Given a set of response action(s), the Executor triggers and executes the actions.
A monitor competes to be the next daemon (i.e. one to take the response action)
by setting an action timer inversely proportional to its action e↵ectiveness and takes
the action when the timer fires. Note that some actions, such as log, analyze, etc.,
are executed by each node independently whereas for actions, like retransmit data,
redundant actions by the neighbors should be minimized. In the latter case, upon
hearing an action taken by a monitor, other monitors in the neighborhood stop their
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action timers to refrain themselves from taking any further action for that incident.
Any communication related to response actions or with the BS is handled by the
Communicator module.
7.3 Kinesis System Details
7.3.1 State Information
Each node u maintains a list of its neighbors, N(u), and link quality, L(u, k),
with each neighbor k 2 N(u). Also, u retains: (i) Per-neighbor sliding window w
k
of size W to record the neighbor behavior observations. Using the behavior history,
u updates the security estimation and state of the neighbors. (ii) An action timer
value to indicate how long u waits before triggering the next action, if it wins the
competition.
7.3.2 Response Policy Specification
For modeling response policies in Kinesis, we propose a WSN specific lightweight
policy language based on the Event-Condition-Action (ECA) paradigm [95]. A re-
sponse policy is defined on an incident (equivalent to event in ECA) and specifies
actions for di↵erent security estimations, which combine the various conditions on
the incident and the suspect. We adopt the ECA paradigm since it is inline with our
incident-centric approach for response management and simplifies policy specification.
The response policies are specified as a set of rules, expressed with the grammar
in Table 7.1. The words within quotes ’ ’ are static tokens and the italics represent
functions. The main construct of the language is <rule> which defines the response
policy corresponding to an attack or anomaly.
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Table 7.1: Response Policy Language
<rules> ::= ’Begin’ <rule-list> ’End’
<rule-list> ::= <rule> <rule-list> | <rule>
<rule> ::= ’on’ <incident> (<condition> <action-list>)+
<incident> ::= <anomaly> | <attack>
<anomaly> ::= data loss | data alteration | data replay | ...
<attack> ::= unknown | selective forwarding | jamming | ...
<condition> ::= <condition>*|’if’ <incident> ’then’
|’if’ severity(<suspect>,<incident>) <op> (<value>|<range>) ’then’
<op> ::= ’<’ | ’>’ | ’<=’ | ’>=’ | ’==’ | ’ !=’ | ’IN’
<action-list> ::= <action>, <action-list> | <action>
<action> ::= <conservative-action> (<suspect>)*
|<moderate-action> (<suspect>)*
|<aggressive-action> (<suspect>)*
<aggressive-action> :: = revoke | reauthenticate | rekey | ...
<moderate-action> ::= retransmit data | trigger data authentication | ...
<conservative-action> ::= nop | analyze | alert | ...
<suspect> ::= <digit>+ | <literal> (<literal>*<digit>*)*
<range> ::= (’[’|’(’) <value>–<value> (’)’|’]’)
<value> ::= <digit> | <digit>+. <digit>+
<digit> ::= [’0’-’9’]
<literal> ::= [’A’-’Z”a’-’z’]
Through a detailed analysis of the various attacks in WSNs and corresponding
remedies, we have identified a comprehensive set of response actions, listed in Ta-
ble 7.3. The actions are categorized into three classes based on the severity:
(i) Conservative: Low severity actions that may help a monitor in more precise at-
tack detection or in not executing erroneous responses, but cannot prevent or recover
from attacks.
(ii) Moderate: Actions intended to preserve the WSN services under failures or
attacks.
(iii) Aggressive: High severity responses which are executed to recover from an
attack and to prevent further malicious attempts. These actions may be executed at
local sensors or may require help from the BS to execute them.
An example policy for data alteration incident is shown in Table 7.2. Here,
nodeID refers to the suspect node identifier.
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Table 7.2: Response Policy Example
on ’data alteration’
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) <= 0.3 then retransmit data
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) IN (0.3,0.6]
then retransmit data, trigger route change
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) > 0.6
then revoke nodeID
Table 7.3: Taxonomy of Response Actions
Actions Descriptions
CONSERVATIVE: Low Severity
nop No actions to take
log, analyze Record auxiliary information and analyze
alert Notify the suspicious node(s) or other neighbors/the BS about the misbehavior
MODERATE: Medium Severity
discard data Prevent forwarding false data
retransmit data Retransmits cached data
trigger reauthentication Re-authenticate the suspicious node
trigger route change Change route and notify others
trigger multipath routing Route data through multiple paths
suspend Temporarily block the suspect node
AGGRESSIVE: High Severity
revoke Black list/block the convicted node
re-program Re-program the malicious node
re-key Re-key the (sub) network
flood alerts Flood alert messages in the network
7.3.3 Policy Matching and Response Selection
Since response policies are defined specific to incidents, it is straightforward to
match the policy for an incident in Kinesis. However, the action to execute is selected
dynamically from the action set specified by the matched policy, based on the security
assessment of the suspect. This strategy ensures that Kinesis takes the most e↵ective
action at any incident.
The security assessment of a node is quantified by a Security Index (SI). In Kine-
sis, a monitor continuously updates per-neighbor security state records based on its
observations of the neighbor behaviors. The SI of a neighbor is also updated on each
observation. If a neighbor shows legitimate behavior, its SI is updated based on the
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behavior observations only. Otherwise, if an incident is reported (i.e. a misbehavior
is observed), SI is updated based on three factors:
(i) Incident Confidence: The confidence with which an incident is detected, denoted
by a Confidence Index (CI).
(ii) Incident Impact: A numeric value of the impact of the incident on the WSN,
denoted by an Impact Index (II).
(iii) Neighbor behavior history: The continuous behavior observations and security
state of the neighbor, reflecting how much the monitor believes the suspect node.
In what follows, we discuss how Kinesis computes these indices and then selects
the response action based on SI.
Confidence Index (CI)
The IDS associates a confidence value with each incident reported to indicate
the likelihood of its occurrence. We utilize it to select a response action since it
measures how e↵ective the IDS is in detecting an incident and how severe the response
should be. However, if the IDS does not provide an in-built confidence value, Kinesis
computes CI as follows:
(i) For Anomalies, we consider CI = 1. This is reasonable since watchdog monitors
can correctly identify a failure or misbehaving event [49].
(ii) For Attacks, CI is computed as a false alarm rate based on the past performance
of the IDS about successfully detecting attacks. Thus, CI is computed as:
CI =
# of true attacks
# of attacks reported
(7.1)




The II estimates the overall impact of an anomaly/attack and implies the urgency
and extremity of the response action Despite extensive work on vulnerability scoring
in enterprise networks [98], little attention is paid to WSNs. A few mathematical
risk models for WSNs have been proposed [99], but they do not provide a complete
framework considering the WSN specific practical concerns. In this work, we propose
a simple mechanism to estimate the impact of an incident.
Table 7.4 lists the consequences of incidents to the WSN services. Based on the
priority of the WSN, the BS assigns static scores to the impacts and configures the
nodes with the incident-impact mapping and impact scores. On receiving a report of













where k is the type of impact, n is the total number of k-type impacts, impactk
x
is
an n-length array of k-type impacts for incident x where impactk
x
[j] = 1 means that
the incident has j-th impact, and rk is an array of impact scores associated with
the k-type impacts. Using Eq. 7.2, Kinesis computes the Data Impact (Id), Network
Impact (In), Node Impact (Is) of the incident and then the II as follows:
II(x) =  
d
⇥ Id(x) +  
n
⇥ In(x) +  
s
⇥ Is(x) (7.3)













Note that if the network administrator does not change the WSN priorities, the Impact
Indexes are static and need to be calculated only once after deployment.
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Table 7.4: Possible impacts of WSN anomalies and attacks
Data Impact Data delay, unavailability, alteration, falsification
Network Impact Network unavailability, disruption; Path unavailability
Node Impact Node unavailability, misbehavior, malfunction
Neighbor Behavior Observations
The neighbor behaviors help a monitor assess how vulnerable the neighbor is
and how likely that it is going to make an attack. Hence, we consider the behavior
observations of the suspect node while determining the severity of the response action.
Usually IDSes maintain the behavior history and trust scores [100]. However to
conform with IDSes without such facilities, we provide a design to record the neighbor
behaviors and to utilize them in computing security score and state.
To justify the accuracy of the response action, we utilize the history of neighbor
behaviors rather than the latest single behavior. Kinesis maintains a per-neighbor
sliding window w
k
of size W to keep track of the neighbor’s most recent W behaviors.
When the IDS notifies about a behavior of neighbor k, Kinesis pushes out the oldest
behavior from w
k
and stores the recent one. We consider two types of behaviors:
(i) Service Behavior : How trustworthy a neighbor node is in providing WSN services,
e.g., in-time packet forwarding.
(ii) IPRS Behavior : How e cient and honest the neighbor is in taking required and
desired actions.
Security Index and State Update
Amonitor u computes SI for each neighbor k 2 N(u) on each behavior observation
for k and updates the security state accordingly. A node is estimated to be in five
possible states: (i) Fresh, (ii) Suspicious, (iii) Secure, (iv) Malicious, and (v) Revoked.
Figure 7.3 shows the security state transition diagram. After the network deployment,
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a monitor assigns to all its neighbors the Fresh state with SI = 0. For a pre-specified
amount of time t
f
, a neighbor is considered to be in Fresh state while its SI is updated
on behavior observations according to Eq. 7.6. The significance of Fresh state is that
a neighbor is given the benefit-of-doubt while being in this state. Although the SI
of a suspect node in Fresh state a↵ects the response selection, no aggressive action
is taken against the node, i.e., the node is not revoked, reprogrammed, etc. After
a time of t
f
, the neighbor moves to Suspicious or Secure state based on its SI. A
node in the Suspicious state moves to the Secure state if its SI decreases due to
legitimate behaviors. On the contrary, if a node in the Suspicious state continues
its anomalous behavior, its SI goes above a pre-defined threshold  2 and the node
moves to the Malicious state. When a neighbor goes to the Malicious state, the
monitor initiates an aggressive action against the node. A neighbor node can also be
revoked anytime due to the monitor’s own decision or action initiated by neighboring
monitors. In this case, the monitor enlists the suspect node as Revoked and discards
further request/data from the node.
We formulate the computation of SI of a neighbor k with two auxiliary functions
f(x) and g(SI), where f(x) computes the severity of an incident x and g(SI) returns





1 ; SI   1 i.e k is Fresh/Secure
1.5 ;  1  SI   2 i.e k is Suspicious






0 ; x is good behavior
min(CI ⇥ II(x)⇥ g(SI), 1) ; otherwise
(7.5)
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Fig. 7.3.: Security State Diagram of a Monitored Node
7.3.4 Response Computation and Optimization
If the IDS reports a single anomaly/attack corresponding to an incident, Kinesis
computes the SI, matches the response policy and selects the SI based action(s) from
the matched policy. When multiple possible incidents are reported, we may follow
the same procedure to select the action(s) for each reported incident and compute
the final action set as a union of these actions. However, each individual action set
may be inclusive, overlapping, inconsistent with respect to the other sets. Moreover,
before considering new action(s) for execution, we should check the on-line actions to
find out the same relationships. To resolve this issue for a limited resource system,
we introduce the action precedence graph.
The Action precedence graph (APG) is a directed graph which describes the
precedence relationship between actions in terms of their e↵ectiveness. Here, (i)
each node a
i




denotes that the parent action a
i
invalidates the child action a
j








are contradictory actions and on conflict, a
i
is executed. Thus the execution of an
action a
i
invalidates all of its successors, and a
j
not reachable by a
i
means that they




conflict if one can reach the other only
through a path of black edges. An example APG is shown in Figure 7.4 where the
reprogram action overrules all of its successors, {log, analyze, alert} are independent
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of each other, and {retransmit data, reauthenticate data, discard data} conflict. We
assume that the BS pre-configures the nodes with all possible response actions and
the precedence relationships between them.
Algorithm 3 : cors() - Computation of Optimized Response Set
Input: Response sets A = {a
i
}, B = {b
i
}
Output: Optimized response set O
if A = B then






























O  A [ (A\B) // A intersects B
else
O  A [ B // A is independent to B
end if
By utilizing the APG, Algo. 3 computes the equivalence, independence, intersec-
tion, and coverage relationships between two action sets. To compute the optimized
action set from n di↵erent action sets {A1, A2, . . . , An} (each specific to an individ-















Fig. 7.4.: Example of an Attack Precedence Graph
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7.3.5 Execution of a Response Action
The response action executions are fully distributed in Kinesis. The low/medium
severity actions are executed by the monitors solely based on their own decisions. The
high severity actions against convicted nodes require consensus among the monitors
in the neighborhood. In the latter case, a selected monitor node (daemon) broad-
casts a message asking the decisions of other monitors, performs a majority voting
on the collected replies, and then executes the agreed upon action. Some aggressive
actions, such as reprogram, rekey, etc. cannot be completed at the sensors. In such a
scenario, the daemon node notifies the BS with an authenticated report and the BS
then performs the action. In addition, even though some actions like retransmit data,
alert others, etc. can be executed upon a monitor’s own decision, they require inter-
actions with other nodes. In all these cases, a monitor has to initiate the action
and take over all the related responsibilities. Kinesis dynamically selects the most
competent node as the daemon to ensure the action e↵ectiveness and to avoid the
same node doing all the job all the time.
Selection of the Daemon
A node is selected as the daemon via a self-organized competition among neigh-
boring monitors. The novelty of our scheme is that we do not need any message
exchange or special time synchronization among neighbors to manage the action ex-
ecutions. Each node in a neighborhood competes independently through a locally
managed back-o↵ timer, called action timer. The timer value of a node u depends
on the action e↵ectiveness, AE(u), of the node, which is estimated locally based on:
(i) neighborhood size, (ii) one-hop link qualities, and (iii) time since last action. In-
tuitively, if a node has more neighbors with good link qualities, it can interact with
more monitors and help minimize redundant actions. Again, if the node is idle for a
99
long time, it should take the action to ensure load distribution in the neighborhood.
Thus, the AE(u) is computed as follows:





Here, c1, c2 are real numbers, N(u), N(s) denote the neighbors of u and the
suspect node, respectively, L(u, k) is the link quality between u and the monitor k,
and t
l
is the time since last action by u. The higher the AE(u), the more e↵ective
u’s action is. u joins the competition to be next daemon by setting the timer value
inversely proportional to AE(u).
ActionT imer(u) / 1
AE(u)
(7.8)
Thus, a node with better AE has lower back-o↵ period and wins the daemon
selection competition. When the action involves a transmission and a neighbor k
overhears it, the node stops its running timer to avoid any redundant action for
the same incident and updates its t
l
and AE value. Kinesis could allow redundant
actions with a goal to enhance the system reliability. For example, suppose that node
u drops data packets and one of its monitors retransmits the dropped packets. If
another attacker v in the data flow path drops retransmitted packets, then redundant
transmissions by multiple neighbors of u may help mitigate data loss. However when
v drops data, its neighboring monitors retransmit the data, which invalidates the
necessity of redundant actions by u’s neighbors. Our experimental results also support
the design of minimizing redundant actions as we see very low data loss rate in the
presence of multiple attackers.
Consensus among the monitors
To execute high severity actions, the monitors consult with each other and decide
an action based on majority voting. After selecting a response action, the daemon
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node broadcasts an authenticated status req msg in the neighborhood. The message
contains the (i) detected attack, (ii) the suspect node, (iii) the response decision, and




Upon receiving the message, each neighboring monitor replies with an authen-
ticated status reply msg, containing the local response decision. The daemon node
computes and broadcasts again the majority voting result. Based on the voting de-
cision, the daemon may execute the agreed upon action or notify the BS with an
authenticated report to trigger the action. The neighboring monitors also observe
each other to check whether they abide by the voting decision and otherwise records
a bad behavior for the misbehaving node.
7.3.6 Response Feedback
The majority voting decision gives a feedback to the monitors about their accuracy
in terms of detecting an incident and selecting the actions. If the severity of the agreed
upon action is lower than the locally determined action at a node, it implies a false
alarm and decreases the confidence of the monitor. Every monitor node keeps the
records of its false alarms and updates its CI. Note that we do not consider false
negatives here. Response feedback may also help assess the e↵ectiveness of the taken
action for an incident. However, we do not investigate the direction in this work.
7.3.7 Secure Policy Storage and Dissemination
A naive approach to store the policies is to use a file or database, which Ki-
nesis would read to select the response policy for an incident. Despite simplicity
and incremental update facility for policies, this approach has significant drawbacks.
Most of the operating systems for sensors do not support file or memory protection.
So, malicious modules can manipulate the policy file/database. Also reading the
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file/database on each incident results in a large number of expensive operations for
resource constrained sensors.
To overcome these di culties, Kinesis allows the BS to generate a binary from
the input policy file and to disseminate the binary throughout the WSN as standard
code dissemination. To implement new response actions or update response policies,
the BS generates a binary of the updated Kinesis implementation and disseminates
the updated binary. The binary dissemination is likely to be more expensive than an
incremental policy update as in the naive approach. However, we assume that action
or policy changes are infrequent and thus do not become a serious concern. It
also eliminates the need for expensive read of flash memory at run-time. To maintain
the integrity of policies, we utilize secure code dissemination protocols for WSNs [96].
Since policy dissemination is secure and a node only installs an authenticated binary
at any time, the policy integrity is ensured.
7.3.8 Implementation and Configuration
We implement Kinesis in TinyOS 2.x. We adapt the Skipjack encryption based
CBC-MAC implementation in TinySec [86] for TinyOS 2.x to compute a 4-byte MAC
while majority voting. The implementation is lightweight since it takes 0.38 ms for
Mica2 motes [86] and would take less time in TelosB platform since TelosB has higher
processing capability than Mica2 mote.
The modular design and implementation of Kinesis add flexibility to the system.
According to the policy language we define in Sec. 7.3, policy rules are implemented as
switch-case based on incident. This strategy optimizes the implementation. Security
state thresholds ( 1,  2) are used to specify the severities in policies. To compute
 1,  2, we average over all the incident impacts, measure SI with this average impact
for various attack rates, and select the values based on the tolerance to attack rates.
The particular set of response actions used to specify the policies are determined
based on the security goals of the WSN application.
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As Kinesis configuration, the WSN administrator configures the sensors with the
incident-impact mappings, impact scores, and the real coe cients. The data, network,
or node impacts of an incident do not vary across di↵erent WSNs, hence the incident-
impact mappings are static. On the contrary, how severely an incident a↵ects the
WSN services may well depend on the network application. Thus, the impact scores
and   coe cients, used to compute the II, should be set by the administrator ac-
cording to the application requirements. However, we assume that these configuration
parameters are changed infrequently over the network lifetime.
7.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results to show the performance of Kinesis
under various network settings.
7.4.1 Simulation Setup
For simulation, we use the TinyOS simulator TOSSIM. The network topologies are
generated with symmetric links. As a routing protocol, we use the standard Collection
Tree Protocol (CTP). In the experiments, we consider the following application and
network layer anomalies and attacks: (i) data loss, (ii) data alteration, (iii) selective
forwarding, and (iv) sinkhole attack. The policies considered for these incidents are
shown in Table 7.5. To detect incidents, we implement a simple watchdog monitor
based IDS in TinyOS 2.x.







= 0.33. The size of the per-neighbor sliding window, W, is
set to 100. In Sec. 7.3.5, we have stated how we determine the values of  1,  2. A
data source periodically sends out data every 2 seconds. In each run of simulation,
the results are averaged over 3, 000 data transmissions. Unless otherwise stated, we
use the above default values in simulation.
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Table 7.5: Considered Response Policies
on ’data alteration’
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) IN (0,0.2] then retransmit data
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) IN (0.2,0.4]
then trigger route change, retransmit data
if severity(data alteration, nodeID) > 0.4
then retransmit data, revoke nodeID
on ’data loss’
if severity(data loss, nodeID) IN (0,0.2] then retransmit data
if severity(data loss, nodeID) IN (0.2,0.4]
then trigger route change, retransmit data
if severity(data loss, nodeID) > 0.4
then retransmit data, revoke nodeID
on ’selective forwarding’
retransmit data, revoke nodeID
on ’inconsistent etx’
if severity(inconsistent etx, nodeID) IN (0,0.4]
then NOP





The metrics considered to evaluate Kinesis are:
(1) E↵ectiveness: Since our goal is to minimize the impact of data, network, etc.
failure, we show the e↵ectiveness of Kinesis from two aspects:
(i) Data Loss Rate at the BS : The frequency with which the BS experiences the
e↵ect of an incident i.e. the rate of reception failures at the BS. In this context, we
compare the performance of our system with (i) an attack free typical sensor
environment, and (ii) an under-attack network to show that Kinesis can get back
the WSN into a normally operating environment, even under anomalies or attacks.
(ii) Average Data Transmission Delay : On average, the amount of time a packet
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takes to reach the BS since its transmission by the source. Here, we compare the
performance of Kinesis with an attack free scenario.
(2) Optimization of Redundant Actions: The average number of actions taken
per incident by the monitors in a neighborhood. We also measure the rate of redun-
dant actions per incident as a ratio of the number of monitors taking response actions
to the number of monitors that detected the incident. They justify our action timer
design based distributed scheme to trigger the response actions.
(3) Load Balance: How evenly the response action executions are distributed in
the neighborhood. This is indicated by the standard deviation among the number of
actions taken by the monitors in a neighborhood.
(4) Energy Consumption: The sum of energy usage by all the nodes when Kinesis
along with an IDS is in operation.
7.4.3 Grid Network Experiments
We place 16 to 100 nodes in grid topologies of dimensions from 4⇥ 4 to 10⇥ 10,
respectively. The nodes are spaced 1.5 meter apart. For each network, a data source
and an attacker are randomly selected and the results are averaged over 10 runs. The
attack rate is set to 0.1. For concurrent attacks, we place a second attacker both in
the same and di↵erent neighborhood than the first one. Both attackers are equally
likely to make an attack.
Single Attack
First, we show the performance of Kinesis in case of a single incident (anomaly/attack)
in the network.
data loss incident: In this case, a node may be faulty or malicious and drops
data packets intermittently instead of forwarding them to the BS. Fig. 7.5 shows the
performance of Kinesis under data loss incidents in WSNs of sizes from 16 to 100. As
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shown in Fig. 7.5(a), Kinesis reduces the data loss rate of a network under attack from
[0.073, 0.103] to ⇠ 0.002, which is similar to the natural data loss rate (⇠ 0.0018)
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(e) Load balance among neighbor
monitors
Fig. 7.5.: Kinesis Performance for data loss incidents with rate 0.1 in grid networks
of various sizes
Fig. 7.5(b) reveals the linearly increasing trend in average transmission latencies
with network sizes. However, the average latency Kinesis adds due to action execution
is almost invariant ([39.03, 41.607] ms) in di↵erent networks. The delay incurred by
Kinesis is mostly due to the action timer. According to Eq. (7.7) and (7.8), the action
timer value depends on the number of neighbors and the link qualities with them. In
the experiments, neighborhood sizes vary from 3 to 5 in di↵erent networks and the
link quality values lie in [0.8, 0.976]. The combined e↵ect of neighborhood size and
link qualities made the action timer values almost invariant in di↵erent networks.
Thus, the increasing trend in transmission delays is mainly due to the increase in
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monitors
Fig. 7.6.: Kinesis Performance for data loss incidents of various rates in a 10 ⇥ 10
grid network
Fig. 7.5(c) shows that Kinesis is not always able to take a single action per incident
as in ideal case. Occasionally, it triggered as high as 1.4 actions per incident on
average. However the rate of redundant actions, as shown in Fig. 7.5(d), is bounded
by 0.11. The phenomena of redundant actions may occur due to two reasons:
A. Hidden node problem: The problem occurs when the monitors of the source and
the attacker are not connected or weakly connected. We explain the scenario with
Fig. 7.7 - a segment of the attacker’s neighborhood found from a simulation topology.
Node 8 is the source, 18 is the attacker and others are the watchdog monitors.
Fig. 7.7.: A segment of the attacker’s neighborhood in the simulation topology
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When node 18 drops a packet, all the monitors 7, 9, 29 start their action timers.
When the timer in one of the nodes 7 and 9 fires and for example 7 wins, it retransmits
the dropped data and 9 stops its timer upon overhearing the action. Since 29 does
not possess link to either 7 or 9, it cannot overhear whoever takes the action. Being
unaware of other actions on the same incident, 29 will execute the action when its
timer fires. This kind of redundancy is not a sole problem of Kinesis, but will
be a problem for any overhearing based solutions.
B. Action Timer Value: Action timer values at two monitors may be close when
the load balancing factor (i.e. time since last action) is same in both of them and
link qualities with the neighbors cannot make a big di↵erence, and vice versa. Thus,
a monitor may take redundant action if it does not get enough time to hear others’
actions by the time its action timer fires.
The small standard deviation ([1.93, 8.41]) in the number of actions by neighbor-
ing monitors, as shown in Fig. 7.5(e), indicates the high success of Kinesis in load
balancing.
To further analyze the scalability of Kinesis, we measure its performance under
various attack rates in a 100-node network and show in Fig. 7.6 how well Kinesis
survives, even for very high attack rates. As expected and consistent to earlier re-
sults, Kinesis counteracts the data loss attacks and gets the network back to normal
operating condition. Fig. 7.6(a) shows that Kinesis reduces the data loss rate of a
network under attack from [0.02, 0.52] to ⇠0.0001, which proves its e↵ectiveness and
scalability, even under higher attack rates. Fig. 7.6(b) reveals the linearly increas-
ing trend in average transmission latencies with higher rate attacks. Even average
latencies introduced by Kinesis with varying attack rates are negligible ([12,223] ms).
Fig. 7.6(c) shows that the average number of actions per incident is ⇠1.5. The
action redundancy per incident is bounded by 0.16. However, both numbers are
almost invariant with respect to attack rates. This is because the number of actions
depends on the link quality among the neighbors and the di↵erences in their action
timer values. Fig. 7.6(e) shows a small standard deviation in the number of actions
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taken by the neighbors, which indicates the e↵ectiveness of the distributed scheme of
Kinesis in triggering action executions.
data alteration attack: In this attack, a malicious node selectively modifies the
data value in a data packet before forwarding it to the BS. We run simulations for
data alteration attacks and find similar trends in the results as in data loss incidents.
Later on, we show the performance of Kinesis for concurrent incidents of data loss +
data alteration, hence we do not report the graphs here.
selective forwarding attack: In a selective forwarding attack, the monitor
nodes initially observe data loss by the attacker and hence retransmit the dropped
data. Once they detect a selective forwarding attack, the daemon issues a state req msg
to the neighborhood. The neighboring monitors reply with their own action decision
about the suspect in a status reply msg. Based on the majority voting decision from
the replies, the daemon possibly issues a revocation request to the BS. The BS then
disseminates a revoke command to the network, upon receiving which all the nodes
exclude the attacker from the routing path.
Fig. 7.8 reports the performance of Kinesis under selective forwarding attacks in
networks of various sizes. In a selective forwarding attack, no matter whether the
attacker is revoked from the network or not, Kinesis retransmits the packet dropped
by the attacker. Hence, Kinesis reduces the data loss rate of a network under attack
to that of a network without attack. Fig. 7.8(a) supports the claim by showing that
the natural data loss rate and the loss rate of a network under attack with Kinesis
enabled are almost equal.
Fig. 7.8(b) shows an interesting and significantly di↵erent trend in transmission
delays with Kinesis under selective forwarding attack. In this case, the average trans-
mission delays are much lower compared to that of data loss incidents and quite close
to the natural data transmission delays. To analyze the performance better, we show
the average transmission delays over time in Fig. 7.8(c). Initially when the monitors
do not detect the selective forwarding attack yet but only observe data losses, they
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Fig. 7.8.: Kinesis Performance for selective forwarding (SF) attacks in grid networks
of various sizes
revocation of the attacker at packet 1755, there is no attack and hence no delay is
incurred due to response execution.
Fig. 7.8(d) shows the average number of control messages (state req msg + sta-
tus reply msg) exchanged in a neighborhood for majority voting. The state req msg
is of 27 bytes and state reply msg is of 35 bytes. The number of control messages per
majority voting is 6.2 packets. However, it is proportional to the neighborhood size
and thus does not vary with network sizes unless the number of neighbors varies.
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Fig. 7.8(e) - 7.8(g) show that the average number of actions, action redundancy
and load distribution measurements are consistent with the earlier experiments and
can be explained in a similar way.
For the selective forwarding attacks, the monitors always agreed on the decision
to revoke the suspect node. The average time to perform the majority voting and
execute the decided action is ⇠ 96.4 ms, most of which is contributed by the action
timer value.
sinkhole attack: For sinkhole attack, we modify the CTP protocol to enable
the attacker advertising low cost routing path through it. Once the attacker attracts
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Fig. 7.9.: Kinesis performance for sinkhole attack
In Kinesis, a monitor suspects a potential sinkhole attack upon hearing an in-
consistent path cost advertisement, which results in an update in SI for the suspect
but NOP as a response. During the subsequent packet drop observations, the mon-
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Fig. 7.10.: Kinesis performance for data loss + data alteration incidents with various
rates in a 10⇥ 10 grid network
the attack is confirmed. Fig. 7.9(a) shows that Kinesis reduces the data loss rate to
⇠ 0.0015. At the same time, it keeps the transmission delays closer to natural latency,
as shown in Fig. 7.9(b), due to the quick revocation of the attacker node. Note that
the sinkhole attack often created routing loop causing as high as 3.5% data loss. By
revoking the attacker, Kinesis made the WSN stable again.
Concurrent Attacks
In concurrent attack experiments, we consider two cases, (i) two simultaneous but
independent attackers, and (ii) two colluding attackers.
(i) In case of two concurrent but independent attackers, we consider an attacker
causing data loss and the other conducting data alteration at various rates in a 10⇥10
grid WSN. As we see in Fig. 7.10, Kinesis shows behaviors consistent with the single
attack scenario, in all the aspects. Thus, Kinesis is e↵ective under concurrent and
high rate attackers.
(ii) Next, we consider two colluding attackers performing sinkhole and selec-
tive forwarding (SF) attack. When the sinkhole attacker is revoked, routing path
changes enable data routing through the SF attacker which then drops data at a
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Fig. 7.11.: Kinesis performance for sinkhole + SF attacks in grid networks of various
sizes
The irregularity occurring when the number of nodes is equal to 16 is due to the
temporary routing instability after revocations.
Varying the Number of Attackers
To further show the scalability of Kinesis, we present its performance in a multi-
attacker environment. Here, we consider data loss incident and vary the number
of attackers from 2% to as high as 20% of the total nodes in a 100-node network.
Fig. 7.12(a) shows that Kinesis still keeps the data loss rate lower than 0.009. Due to
Kinesis, the average transmission latencies vary within [122.33,189.46] ms, as shown







































(b) Average data transmis-
sion delay
Fig. 7.12.: Kinesis Performance for data loss for various % of attackers (with rate
0.1) in a 10⇥ 10 grid network.
Energy Consumption
We measure and compare the aggregated energy consumption of the WSN under
various incidents while Kinesis (as well as the IDS) is in operation and in an attack-
free scenario where Kinesis is not deployed (baseline). For energy measurement,
we consider MICAz platform and use PowerTOSSIM z [101] plugin. Due to the
scalability limit of PowerTOSSIM z, we consider a 6 ⇥ 6 grid WSN with one source
and one attacker.
In a Kinesis enabled system, overhearing does not incur overhead since it is in-
herent in WSNs. In TinyOS, the radio stack requires a node to receive and process
all the packets transmitted in a neighborhood to understand whether the packet is
destined to it or not. TinyOS also exposes the Receiver [102] interface that allows
one to perform actions upon overhearing a message in transit. Thus, the only energy
overhead imposed to the nodes is due to the IDS and Kinesis operations. The results
reported in Table 7.6 show that Kinesis system incurs only a maximum of 0.06%
energy overhead.
Table 7.6: Aggregated energy cost of the WSN without and with Kinesis + IDS
Baseline
Kinesis
— data loss SF sinkhole
Energy usage (⇥107 mJ) 1.320488 1.320482 1.321356 1.320480
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Action Timer Configuration
Action timer design is crucial in Kinesis and its configuration impacts the per-
formance with respect to redundant actions and load balance. Hence, we vary the
coe cient factors (c1, c2) in Eq. 7.7 and see the impact of timer values on Kinesis
performance. Since c1, c2 are weight coe cients, c1 + c2 should be bounded to opti-
mize the timer value. If c1 + c2 is too small, the action timer fires frequently which
increases the number of actions. If c1 + c2 is too big, the latency increases. In our
experiment, we fixed c1 + c2 to 8. Fig. 7.13(a) shows that the optimum values of (c1,
c2) in terms of load balance are near (3,5). In Fig. 7.13(b) the optimum value is after
(4.5, 3.5). To optimize both the action redundancy and load balance, (c1, c2) should
be selected onwards (4.5, 3.5).


































(a) Load balance vs Action timer
















































(b) Action redundancy vs Action timer
Fig. 7.13.: Coe cient configuration for Action Timer
7.5 Testbed Evaluation
We ported the Kinesis implementation to the TelosB platform and placed battery-
powered TelosB motes in an indoor environment. Our motes have a 8 MHz TI MSP430
microcontroller, 2.4 GHz radio, 10 KB RAM, and 48 KB ROM. We ran experiments
for data loss, selective forwarding, and sinkhole attacks and use the same metrics as
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in simulation for performance evaluation. The results of the experiments are averaged
over 1500 packets.
7.5.1 Experimental Setup
We build a 6 ⇥ 6 grid WSN, consisting of 36 TelosB motes, in a 160 ⇥ 200 cm2
indoor environment. Fig. 7.14 shows the coordinates of the network nodes, labeled
from 2 to 37. Node 10 is the source, which sends data every 1 second. We controlled
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Fig. 7.14.: Node placement in an indoor 6⇥ 6 grid WSN
the transmission power of motes to ensure multi-hop communication. A special mote,
labeled as node 1, is set to the root node. For performance analysis, the root collects
statistics on the number of data and action packets transmitted, number of actions
per incident, transmission delays and passes these data to a laptop through serial
forwarder.
7.5.2 Kinesis Performance
Below, we present the testbed performance of Kinesis for data loss, selective forwarding,
and sinkhole incidents. For the first two incidents, we set node 16 as the attacker.
data loss incident: We evaluate the performance of Kinesis under various rates
of data loss incidents. Fig. 7.15(a) shows that Kinesis reduces the data loss rate of
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the WSN under attack from [0.1, 0.51] to  0.0015, similar to the natural data loss
rate. The average transmission delays when Kinesis is in operation vary within [97.5,
260.4] ms, as shown in Fig. 7.15(b). Kinesis triggers on average [1.28, 1.97] actions per
incident. Thus the testbed performance of Kinesis is consistent to that in simulations









































(b) Average data transmis-
sion delay
Fig. 7.15.: Testbed performance of Kinesis for data loss incidents of various rates in
a 6⇥ 6 grid WSN.
selective forwarding (SF) attack: Table 7.7 summarizes the performance of
Kinesis under SF attack, where the attacker drops packets at a rate of 0.4. The
attacker is revoked at packet 604. Hence there is no attack and Kinesis actions
afterwards, which keeps the average transmission delays much lower compared to
that of data loss incidents.
Table 7.7: Testbed performance of Kinesis on SF attack
Ideal SF Kinesis + SF
Data loss rate 0.0008 0.064 0.0008
Avg. transmission delay (ms) 32.89 N/A 61.11
Avg. actions per incident N/A N/A 1.6875
sinkhole attack: We conduct two sets of sinkhole attack experiments, setting
two di↵erent nodes 21 and 22 as attackers. Once an attacker is able to attract
surrounding data packets, it drops data at a rate of 0.2. The performance results of
Kinesis are presented in Table 7.8.
117
Table 7.8: Testbed performance of Kinesis on sinkhole
Ideal sinkhole Kinesis + sinkhole
Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 1 Exp 2
Data loss rate 0.011 0.086 0.015 0.20 0.011 0.086
Avg. transmission delay (ms) 71.17 113.03 N/A N/A 75.27 177.36
Avg. actions per incident N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 1.604
The results of experiment 1 are quite similar to simulation results. The attacker is
revoked at packet 158. It is to be noted that the sinkhole attack in this case created
routing loops due to low cost path advertisements by the attacker and thus resulted
in data loss. However, Kinesis took a quick response action to revoke the attacker,
which brought back the routing stability and helped keep the data loss rate minimal.
In experiment 2, we see comparatively higher data reception failure and trans-
mission delay at the BS. This is due to the routing instability created when Kinesis
revoked the attacker at packet 376. Consequently, some packets were lost while a few
others needed unusually longer time to reach the BS until a stable routing path was
re-established.
Energy consumption: Due to the di culty of measuring energy directly on the
sensor hardware [103], we adopt the energy model proposed by Polastre et al. [104]
to estimate the energy cost in testbed. The energy cost of a node is estimated as a
sum of energy usage due to sensing, transmission, and reception. The energy for a
type of operation is computed by multiplying the battery voltage with the current
draw and time spent (according to the TelosB datasheet) for the operation. The ag-
gregated energy cost of the WSN in case of baseline, Kinesis+data loss, Kinesis+SF
are 4232.86, 4447.44, 4467.46 mJ, respectively. Thus, Kinesis (along with the IDS)
incurs a maximum of 5.5% energy overhead.
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7.6 Discussion
In this section, we analyze the characteristics of Kinesis from various aspects and
discuss possible improvements.
False Positive: A false positive occurs if an attack is detected when there is none.
In Kinesis, when a monitor observes an anomalous activity by a neighbor node, it
does not immediately conclude that this is an attack. It continues to observe the node
while taking appropriate response action(s) (conservative or moderate) to mitigate
disruption to WSN services. Thus, as long as Kinesis can keep the WSN functional
(e.g., send data successfully to the BS) and minimize the disruption, our security goal
is achieved.
When the security estimation for the monitored node exceeds a threshold, spec-
ified in the matched response policy, the monitor may go for an aggressive action.
The decision of an aggressive action, however, requires consensus among a minimum
number of neighboring monitors. It is highly unlikely that all of these monitors will
detect a false attack.
Hidden Node Problem: As discussed in Sec. 5.3.1, two disconnected monitors
monitoring the same node may take the same but redundant actions. Since our
security goal is to minimize WSN disruptions (e.g., data, network failure), occasional
redundant actions will not cause problem with respect to this goal.
If these two monitors, however, have di↵erent link qualities with respect to the
monitored node, i.e., one of the monitors has good connectivity, and the other does not
have so good connectivity and misses some activities of the node under consideration,
then the monitors may have di↵erent security evaluations for the monitored node at a
time instant and may decide to execute di↵erent actions. This may raise consistency
issues. If both actions are non-conflicting and are conservative or moderate (e.g.,
log and retransmit data), they will not cause any inconsistency. The only side e↵ect
would be some additional resource (computation, transmission, etc.) usage. The
same holds true when the two actions are conflicting but conservative or moderate,
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for example, retransmit data and trigger route change. However, if at least one of the
actions is aggressive, the monitor node first sends a message to the BS, consisting
of the decision and authenticated agreements from at least a minimum numbers of
neighboring monitors. After verifying the agreements, the BS also checks whether
the action causes any redundancy or inconsistency. Only then, the BS executes the
aggressive action. Thus, the network nodes need not do anything to handle the
consistency issues, if there is any.
From the discussion, it is clear that even if nodes take di↵erent actions, Kinesis still
achieves its security goals. It is to be mentioned that in our experiments, we observe
redundant yet same actions, but no inconsistent actions. To address the hidden node
problem in future, we will investigate a scheme utilizing 2-hop topology knowledge.
We will also explore existing solutions in the context of distributed systems.
Majority Voting: A set of colluding attackers may mislead the majority voting
to decide on a wrong response action. If the attacker(s), replying with a low severity
action, can a↵ect the voting decision to be an action of lower severity than those
reported by honest monitors, it also makes them detecting a false positive and lowering
the monitor confidence. These attacks, however, will not succeed as we assume a
majority of honest nodes in a neighborhood.
A solution to deal with such attacks on majority voting is to set higher weights
on the local decisions of more trustworthy nodes. An alternative approach is to use
complementary methods with Kinesis to detect such attacks. For example, we may
use our previous work on lightweight provenance techniques that enables the BS to
detect a data dropping attack and identify the misbehaving node, based on the data
provenance, i.e., the identities of the source and routing nodes that processed or
forwarded the data towards the BS [105]. In case a number of colluding attackers
falsely report an honest node as a data dropping attacker and ask the BS to take
aggressive action (e.g., revoke) against it, the BS will find an inconsistency between
the reports of the colluding attackers and the data provenance. The reason is that,
based on the provenance information, the BS will not be able to detect any data
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dropping attacks by the honest node. The BS may then conclude about a highly
probable collusion attack and respond accordingly. As part of future work, we will
extend our current implementation by integrating such an approach.
Jamming: An attacker may interrupt Kinesis operation by jamming a part of
the network and disabling data communication. We implemented a jamming attack
following the method described in [106]. This jamming attack, however, results in no
more than 20-30% data loss, which is the same as the data loss in data loss incidents.
As part of future work, we will implement stronger jammers able to block the channel
completely and will investigate whether Kinesis, in response, can send a top priority
message to the BS through the border nodes.
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8. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
8.1 Recovery of Local Fault and Security Attacks at Sensor Nodes
While sensor nodes, through neighbor monitoring, can detect anomalous actions
by a compromised neighbor node and take recovery actions, it is an interesting ques-
tion whether a sensor node itself can predict operational failure or security attacks on
it and be proactive. A node may monitor its residual energy and be conservative in
energy usage by reducing the frequency of sensor operations and may inform the BS
or other nodes when it is about to die out of power. The node may also monitor the
local packet queue, memory write, etc. node properties and take response actions to
prevent failures and attacks, such as network congestion, node compromise through
over-the-air reprogramming, etc.
8.2 Secure Provenance Management in Untrusted Systems
With the emergence of distributed services (e.g. cloud computing, web services,
etc.), sensitive user data may move around multiple organizations and be processed
and stored outside the owner’s control. The problem is exacerbated by the security in-
cidents involving sensitive data leakage, unauthorized access, and integrity violations
which are a daily occurrence. In this context, recording all the operations performed
on a data (i.e. data provenance) is valuable to check the compliance of the data to
quality and trust. The questions to investigate include the (1) reliable provenance
collection in untrusted systems, and (2) secure provenance communication as the data
flows through various systems.
Recently, the notion of secure and self-contained data has been introduced [107]
in the context of building a deployable data protection system. This data object,
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referred to as Security Aware Object (SAO), provides protection to sensitive data
by containing five key components: (1) authentication and authorization tools; (2)
self-enforcement policy engine; (3) security policies in executable form; (4) secure
connection manager; and (5) protected data. Utilizing the SAO capabilities, we
provide a conceptual architecture of the provenance framework in untrusted systems
in Fig. 8.1.
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Fig. 8.1.: Conceptual Architecture of Provenance Framework in Untrusted Systems
Every data object is encapsulated by a SAO containing the protected data and
provenance, access control policies on them, the trusted/untrusted application to per-
form operations on the data. A secure execution environment (SEE) in an untrusted
environment ensures the secure execution of untrusted applications and secure prove-
nance capture. The authentication tool and policy engine guarantee authorized access
to data and provenance. The most significant challenge implied by the conceptual ar-
chitecture is how to collect provenance at a fine granularity yet with high performance.
Design and implementation of the SEE is the core challenge to this work. Regard-
ing the provenance communication, the focus should be on low-overhead provenance
update and encapsulation on every data access.
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9. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we propose an extensive and inter-operable provenance model that can
encapsulate the provenance of data objects with various semantics and granularity.
We then explore the secure provenance collection, communication and usage for vari-
ous distributed systems and investigate the utility of the proposed provenance model
in these systems. We present the preliminary design of a low-overhead file prove-
nance system with an application to the provenance infrastructure for virtualized
environments. The system supports the automatic collection and management of file
provenance metadata, characterized by our provenance model. We then investigate
secure provenance communication in streaming environment and propose two secure
provenance schemes focusing on WSNs. The basic provenance scheme is extended
in order to detect packet dropping adversaries on the data flow path over a period
of time. We also consider the issue of attack recovery and present the design of an
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